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UNCERTAINTY, CHAOS, AND THE TORTS
PROCESS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL FORM
Jason Scott Johnstont
I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

One of the central concerns of contemporary post-Realist jurisprudence is legal determinacy-the ability to formulate legal rules
that yield certain or at least predictable outcomes at least some of
the time.' This preoccupation with uncertainty and indeterminacy
may well be seen to indict Legal Realism as either failure or fraud.
From Holmes to Llewellyn to Posner, pragmatic realists have been
2
optimistic that the law would become more certain and predictable.
t Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; A.B.,
Dartmouth College; J.D., Ph.D., University of Michigan. I am grateful for financial support from the Civil Liability Program at Yale Law School, where I visited as a Fellow
during 1988-89, and from Vanderbilt Law School. I am also grateful for'comments on
earlier versions of this Article from participants in faculty seminars and workshops at
Emory, N.Y.U., Vanderbilt, and Yale Law Schools, the McGill Law Faculty, the Tulane
Economics Department, and from Richard Craswell, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Daniel Farber, Barry Friedman, Henry Hansmann, Avery Katz, Walter Olson, David Partlett, Richard Posner, George Priest, Robert Rasmussen, Carol Rose, Daniel Rubinfeld, Pierre
Schlag, Gary Schwartz, and Ellen Wright Clayton.
1

See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RiGTrrs SERIOUSLY 81-130, 279-90 (1977) (ar-

guing that there is a single correct decision even in cases pitting rules against principles); Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworhin, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205 (1986) (applying the indeterminacy insight to a critique of Dworkin's legal philosophy); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 354 (1973) (arguing
that it is impossible to legitimately conceive ofjudges as rule appliers); Ken Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1989) (describing the spectrum of contemporary
views on the importance of legal determinacy to the general theory of legal obligation
and legal reasoning); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (arguing that the bulk of cases have determinate, predictable outcomes); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 539-44 (1988) (considering the determinants of a formal
legal rule's predictability) [hereinafter Formalism];Joseph Singer, The Playerand the Cards:
Nihilism andLegal Theory, 94 YALE Lj. 1, 14 (1984) (arguing that because legal doctrine is
very indeterminate, under the traditional criteria used to define the rule of law, "the rule
of law has never existed anywhere"); Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987) (exploring some of the problems with
the Critical Legal Studies indeterminacy thesis, arguing that easy cases exist). This is a
greatly abbreviated collection of citations. For more, see the citations in the articles I
have cited.
2 I have attached the "pragmatic realist" label to Holmes, Llewellyn, and Posner
because they all apply to law what Thomas Grey has called the "central pragmatic tenets." See Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 793-805
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Llewellyn felt that as judges became more open and explicit about
the "real" reasons behind their decisions and abandoned rigid formalistic categories (the jurisprudence of rules) in favor of a more
flexible, open-textured and policy-oriented approach (the jurisprudence of balancing), the law would become both more rational and
more predictable. 3 Justice Holmes was just as optimistic about the
evolution toward increased legal certainty, but saw this occurring
primarily through the proliferation of increasingly detailed rules,
rather than open-textured balancing. 4 And in the only systematic
(1989). That is, they all treat law as a "practical enterprise" in the sense that law is
"situated, rooted in custom and shared expectations," and also "instrumental, a means
for achieving socially desired ends." Id at 805. See ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 23-24 (1982) (characterizing Holmes); Karl Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv.L. REV. 1222 (1931);
Richard Posner, TheJurisprdenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); see also Catherine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatismof
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 565-75 (1988).
S According to Llewellyn, much of the conflict and uncertainty in the law resulted
from overly general and abstract legal concepts, "because the 'certainty' sought is conceived verbally, and in terms of lawyers, not factually and in terms of laymen." Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 1241 n.47. The goal of the Realist project was to "center on
certainty for laymen and improve the machinery for achieving it," id. at 1242 n.47, to
eliminate "[d]octrine which purports to cut down all freedom of the judge" but which
"[i]n practice.., leads to the production and use of defacto leeways which de jure are
unmentioned; and defacto but unmentioned leeways are both confusing and not subject
to easy control." Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the NewerJurisprudence,40 COLUM.
L. REV. 581, 595 (1940). Fuller had these same aspirations, and perhaps described them
more clearly. Lon Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 434-35 (1934).
In Fuller's view, the disadvantage of formalistic jurisprudence was that by conceiving of
the "area of legally relevant as quite limited," it created massive uncertainty, because the
formalistic judge first decides a case on non-technical grounds and then puts doctrine
"on the rack" to wring out a technical justification. Id Fuller was quite sure-indeed
felt that Llewellyn had been overly modest not to proclaim-that more open-textured
legal directives, which allow explicit "non-technical" justifications, would bring "greater
certainty in the prediction ofjudicial action." Id. at 435.
4 In Holmes's classic analysis, accident law followed a natural evolutionary process
in which judges first allowed juries to decide a particular sort of case under the general
negligence standard, but then learned from these cases what sort of precautions should
be taken under various circumstances and crystallized this learning into rules by directing verdicts. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 98-99 (M. deWolfe
Howe ed. 1968). This process of rule formation is quite consistent with the general
Realist commitment to clarity and openness about the actual reasons behind judicial
decisions. According to the Realists, a judge's belief that she knows what action is optimal under various circumstances motivates the judge to form rules. Indeed, Holmes
complained that the "social end which is aimed at by a rule of law is obscured and only
partially attained in consequence of the fact that the rule owes its form to a gradual
historical development, instead of being reshaped as a whole, with conscious articulate
reference to the end in view." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897). He criticized judges for failing to adequately "recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the
result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply
to leave the very ground and foundation ofjudgments inarticulate." Id. at 467. Thus, as
insightfully clarified by Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 44
(1983), Holmes was as committed as were the Formalists to specific low-level legal rules.
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economic elaboration on the theme of formal evolution, Judge Posner likewise found a long-term trend toward increased precision in

the law, a trend made both necessary and possible by increased social and technological complexity. 5
Of these commentators, Professor Llewellyn may indeed have
made the most accurate forecast, for countless areas of the law that
were once characterized by formalistic, bright-line rules are now
dominated by balancing tests under general standards such as "reasonableness" or "foreseeability." 6 But bright-line, categorical rules

are far from rare, and may become even more pervasive if contemporary reform movements in tort and other areas succeed.7 Moreover, even in doctrinal areas, such as tort law, where the triumph of
balancing seems most secure, little of the certainty and predictability Llewellyn foresaw has been achieved. Rather, balancing has
His realism was in the rejection of the Formalist attempt to logically deduce these lowlevel rules from abstract general principles.
5 Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL SruD. 257 (1974); see also William Landes & Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 19J. L. & EcON. 249 (1976). For a discussion of Ehrlich
and Posner, see infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text. Holmes, Llewellyn, and Posner are by no means the onlyjurisprudes who have advocated the evolutionary view of
legal change. For surveys of the evolutionary approach, see Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE LJ.1238 (1981); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence,64 TEx. L. REV. 645 (1985).
6 For a sample of excellent articles that reveal the pervasiveness of the movement
from rules to balancing across many doctrinal areas, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987); Richard Danzig, A Comment on
theJurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1983); James Henderson, Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) (tort law developments); Symposium: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 631 (1982);
Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle GroundBetween Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practicein the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
In a fascinating comparative study, Robert Summers and Patrick Atiyah describe
how the British laws of contract and tort have remained far more formal than their
American counterparts. ROBERT SUMMERS & PATRICK ATIYAH, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 84-88, 139-41 (1987). They explain that this difference is a function of the general preference for legislative, rather than judicial, law reform in England,
id. at 139-50, English jurists' elitist distrust of thejury (which has been all but abolished
in civil cases in England), and trust in other governmental authorities (which explains
the generally less rule-oriented English criminal law), id. at 37-39, along with a variety of
other historical and cultural factors. The classic comparative and general analysis of
form, however, remains Max Weber's interpretation of the contrasting formal characteristics of the capitalistic systems in Great Britain and Germany. See MAX WEBER ON LAW
IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 301-21 (Max Rheinstein ed. 1954).
7 Many recently enacted statutory measures immunize, or permit the immunization of, certain types of actors from potential liability under vague balancing tests. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (Supp. 1988) (director liability for breach of the duty
of care); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-33-1 (1987) (municipal liability); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2798.1 (West Supp. 1988) (municipal liability).
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been attacked precisely because it is uncertain and unpredictable. 8
Such uncertainty has been shown to have potentially serious economic consequences in discouraging certain socially desirable, but
risky, activities. 9 Others view the uncertainty inherent in balancing
as fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of law.' 0
For some, the response to our post-Realist disappointments is
clear. Members of the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement
have argued that all legal doctrine must be indeterminate and unpredictable to some degree, and that the debate over legal formality
and predictability should not be allowed to obscure the inevitability
of choice in adjudication."I For commentators on the other side of
the political/economic spectrum, by contrast, the problem is not
8
The more notable criticism includes PETER HUBER, LIABILITY (1988); Richard Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. LJ.469 (1987); George Priest, Products Liabil-

ity Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR POLICY 184 (Robert E. Litan

& Clifford Winston eds. 1988).
9 This basic proposition has long been recognized. See, e.g., United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). Economic analysis has only recently
shown that underdeterrence as well as overdeterrence may result from a vague balancing test; the analysis has explored particular conditions under which overdeterrence will
occur. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 79-83, 93-99 (1987);
John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Jason Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137 (1987).
10 See Henderson, supra note 6. The view that the rule of law requires certain or
predictable legal outcomes is a hallmark of many liberal theories. See, e.g. ANDREW ALT-

57-103 (1990) (describing the CLS attack on the liberal
rule of law position); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REV.
781, 784-87 (1989) (describing the instrumental conception of the Rule of Law).
11 See Alan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff. Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1477, 1508-09 (1984) (describing the CLS deconstructionist strategy). But see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45-47 (1987) (the
-more coherent CLS position has moved away from the tendency of certain Legal Realists to focus on the limitlessness of interpretations of each verbal command" and modified the Realist claim to hold that "[i]t is possible to establish legal rules, increasingly
detailed in covering available cases, that can become mechanically applicable to the vast
bulk of actual controversies, but practice may well become settled only at the cost of
principled doctrine becoming chaotic."); see also Pierre Schlag, CannibalMoves: An Essay on
the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 405-29 (1985) (deconstructing various accounts of
the rules standards debate) [hereinafter Rules and Standards]. Ironically, the most wellknown CLS analysis of legal form, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Form and Substance], attempts not
.to deconstruct form but to show how rules serve substantive individualism and how
standards serve substantive altruism. Id. at 1713-76. Kennedy's structure has been
forcefully attacked. See M. KELMAN, supra at 54-62; Rules and Standards,supra, at 418-22;
Louis Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413,
418-19 (1984); Paul Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 947 (1986). Kennedy apparently no longer sees a strong relationship between form and substance. He argues instead that, viewed 'from within the practiceof legal
argument," legal directives are both "objective" and "manipulable." Duncan Kennedy,
Toward a CriticalPhenomenology ofJudging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OF IDEOLOGY 141,
166 (Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds. 1987).
MAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
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that all law is indeterminate, but merely that balancing tests do not
properly constrain legal decisionmakers and do not adequately de12
lineate private property and the sphere of individual autonomy.
On this latter view, the solution is simple: a return to a more ruleoriented jurisprudence.13
However, just as the pragmatic realist notion of the evolution of
legal form has failed as a predictive theory, so, too, do these polar
views on legal rules fail to provide significant normative guidance.
Most CLS analysis is concerned with showing how and when legal
doctrine can be manipulated in various contexts, but it neglects the
influence of doctrine on the behavior of those outside the system:
actors who must decide what to do based on predicted legal consequences. 14 To the extent that writers in (or near) this school consider the impact of legal form on ex ante behavior, they tend to rely
on a rather naive axiom that only predictable, formally realizable
legal rules have important effects on behavior. For their part, those
who advocate a return to rules, such as Richard Epstein and Justice
Scalia, certainly emphasize the instrumental, ex ante effects of such
rules. But they essentially assume away what many regard as the
most enduring Realist insight-that even apparently clear, brightline rules must at least be fuzzy around the edges. As H.L.A. Hart
put it:
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then
their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be
For the classic statement of this position, see F.A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD To
78 (1944) ("One could write a history of the decline of the Rule of Law... in
terms of the progressive introduction of these vague formulas into legislation and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty of, and the consequent disrespect for, the law and judicature"). For a more recent analysis, which emphasizes that
this problem does not go away just by characterizing a balancing test as "cost-benefit
analysis," see Mario Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, in EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 232, 233 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds.
1987); see also Epstein, supra note 8; Steven H. Hanke, Comment. Compatibility of Legal Rules
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra, at 245; Glen
0. Robinson, Comment: Simplicity versus Complexity in the Law, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND
THEJUDICIARY, supra, at 249. The tension between formalism and predictability of legal
outcomes on the one hand and the achievement of substantive ethical or political goals
with the law on the other was also a dominant theme in Weber's thinking about legal
form. For an illuminating discussion Of Weber's often ambiguous treatment of substance versus form and rational versus irrational in the law, see ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX
WEBER 72-95 (1983).
13 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); F.A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 106-07, 114, 122
(1973); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
For a response to Scalia, see Laurence Tribe, Remarks: Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 726 (1989).
14
But see M. KELMAN, supra note 11, at 86-113; Form and Substance, supra note 11, at
1685-1710 (analyzing the instrumental perspective on form); Rules and Standards, supra
note 11, at 383-89 (summarizing Kennedy's instrumental analysis of form).
12

SERFDOM
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a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which
for generations has been cherished as the very perfection of
human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or in15
deed anyone, should do ....
It may be that clear rules constrain the state and facilitate private
ordering, but the relevant question is how the desirability of rules is
affected by our knowledge that they will be interpreted and applied
with substantial uncertainty. Criticism levied against the "conventional" arguments for or against rules or standards may thus be put
with equal force against both verbal skeptics, who stress the inevitability of indeterminacy, and consequentialists, who praise the virtues
of simple rules. Neither verbal skeptics nor consequentialists provide fresh insight into the tie between the form of the law and the
substantive effects of law on behavior.
In this Article, I attempt to bridge the gap between verbal skepticism and simple consequentialism by building and applying an
economic theory of legal form under uncertainty. I focus on two
central issues in the instrumental analysis of legal form: how form
affects behavioral incentives, and how legal form evolves through
the common law process. My analysis shows that these two issues
are closely related. Uncertainty affects incentives under alternative
forms of law; incentives in turn affect both the kinds of cases that are
brought and litigated and the dynamics of legal change. My analysis, moreover, reveals subtleties that previous work has not identified: the fact that bright line rules can be blurry around the edges
does not mean that incentives under uncertain, blurry bright-line
rules are the same as incentives under an open-textured balancing
test. Most remarkably, perhaps, my theory suggests a pattern not of
legal evolution-whether evolution from formalism and toward
open-textured balancing (Ala Llewellyn) or toward increasingly precise formal rules (A la Holmes and Posner)-but rather a pattern of
16
ceaseless oscillation, from rules to balancing and back again.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
15
607-08 (1958). For an interesting attempt to relate this insight to contemporary models
of human perception and the formation of verbal categories, see Steven Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, MetaphoricReasoning, and the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1159-1233 (1989).
16 Thus, this Article shows that form-the way legal outcomes are reached-can be
as important from the point of view of economic incentives as are the outcomes themselves. Ernest Weinrib expresses the opposite view: efficiency is not implicated by the
"structure of thought internal to the law from which these determinations [outcomes]
emerge as conclusions or specifications." Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1015 (1988). Weinrib finds two abstract forms,
corrective and distributive justice, immanent in the law, id at 978-83, but then fails to

pursue his stated objective in discovering such general formal features, which is to gain a
critical perspective from which to scrutinize particular features to see whether they adequately express these general forms. Id. at 974-75. Although Weinrib's analysis pos-
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My analysis of legal form is premised on the general view that
the law's impact on behavior is a function of two worlds. In the
realm of legal decisionmaking, judges and juries seek, ex post, to answer questions about ex ante behavior, questions which generically
take the form of "what did she do?" and "did she do something for
which she should be held liable?" In the sphere of ex ante private
choice, self-interested actors make plans based on their beliefs
about how the legal decisionmaker will answer the ex post questions
that determine their legal liability. - Under this general view, both
the worid of ex ante private choice and the world of expost legal decision will be inherently uncertain. Legal decisions must be made
with only an opaque, evidentiary view of what the ex ante circumstances were and what private choice was actually taken. Forecasting ex ante what these ex post decisions will be is even more
complicated because of disagreement among legal decisionmakers
over the question of what private actions "should" entail legal
liability.
My admittedly abstract and simple model of form and incentives attempts to capture the most important features of these two
complex and uncertain worlds. I assume that we may distinguish, at
least as a purely logical matter, between two types of legal liability
directives. A rule attempts to simplify the complexity behind our
two worlds by singling out one or several features of the ex ante
world as determinative of the ex post decision. A rule might specify a
single criterion that must be met to satisfy a tort duty (e.g., "drive at
less than 55 miles per hour . . ."); and a rule might specify also a
single condition under which such a duty even exists (e.g., "... . when
driving on an urban road."). I contrast the rule with what I shall
refer to as case-by-case balancing. Balancing does not single out any
particular feature of the ex ante landscape as determinative of ex post
liability, but rather requires the ex post decisionmaker to meet the ex
ante world head on, and to decide whether the private actor did what
she should have, given all the circumstances of which she should
have been aware at the time she acted. A general standard in our
tort example might be "reasonable care in light of reasonably foreseeable risks." Balancing would require the legal decisionmaker to
weigh the costs and benefits of alternative private choices to determine whether the private actor conformed to the general
17
standard.
sesses a certain appeal in demonstrating internal formal structure, it ultimately lacks
normative bite.
17 For a very similar definition of formal rules and a justification of the distinction
between formal and non-formal legal directives, see Formalism, supra note 1, at 520-38.
See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-28 (1961) (tort law balancing a classic
example of how a categorical rule is inappropriate when we cannot foresee "before par-
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Of course, neither rules nor balancing exist in these pure forms.
The process of applying rules requires both interpretation of the
rule and some, albeit relatively limited, factual findings about the ex
ante world. The process of balancing requires a more extensive set
of factual findings, and application of a general standard, such as
reasonableness, by a decisionmaker who may or may not measure
reasonableness under a consequentialist cost-benefit framework. It
is the recognition that these regimes are not pure, however, which
structures my economic analysis. Pure forms create very different
incentives for the ex ante private actor, and incentives do indeed tend
to converge as the forms become impure; but even impure forms
still remain distinct in important ways which influence the kinds of
cases likely to be brought to trial and pursued through appeal.
Forms actually "converge" only in the sense that each type of formal
regime tends to select out cases that expose its weakness to judicial
scrutiny, so that each type of formal regime itself generates a pull
toward the other.
Utilizing the famous Goodman 18 and Pokora 19 torts cases, Part II
works through the economic analysis underlying these results. Part
III then compares my analysis and conclusions to previous instrumental investigations of form. Part IV illustrates my analysis with
selected examples from the law of torts. Part V concludes with some
notes on issues still to be addressed.
II
THE ECONOMICS OF RULES VERSUS BALANCING

A.

Structure of the Model

Having set out in Part I what I mean by a categorical rule and by
balancing under a general standard, we can proceed in this part to
work through some of the economic properties of these alternative
formal regimes. Throughout the analysis, I maintain several as20
sumptions. I assume a situation where bargaining is not possible
(having in mind the paradigm drawn from tort law, where two strangers interact at a highway intersection). I assume that private actors
are aware of the law, risk neutral and self-interested, and that they
seek to minimize their total expected costs, which equal the cost of
being careful plus expected liability. Perhaps most importantly, I
posit a single purpose for the law: the creation of efficient incenticular cases arise, precisely what sacrifice or compromise of interests or values we wish
to make in order to reduce the risk of harm.").
18 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
19 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
20
In the concluding part, I discuss the need for separate analysis of the impact of
legal form on bargaining. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
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tives for accident avoidance. Private actors are complying with the
purpose underlying the law if they take the efficient level of care
under the circumstances. I do not assume that the creation of efficient ex ante incentives is the only legitimate goal for the law. However, the relation of legal form to ideology has been extensively
discussed by others, 2 1 and I confine my focus here to economic issues that have not been so thoroughly analyzed. Primarily, I make
the foregoing assumptions in order to analyze the limited issue of
how rules and balancing affect ex ante incentives to take care. At
times, I will also discuss how differential administrative costs of
rules and balancing affect their comparative efficiency, and my assumptions about such costs will be clarified at those points.
B.

Categorical Rules
1. Static Incentives

This section analyzes a rational, cost-minimizing actor's incentives to comply with a categorical rule. There are three fundamental
results. First, in a world where random circumstances determine
what action is socially optimal in any particular case, any general or
categorical rule declaring that liability is avoided if a specified action
was taken or if a certain set of limited circumstances obtained will
create an artificial incentive for actors to comply with the rule. The
incentive is artificial because it reflects not the social costs and benefits of alternative actions in the particular case, but rather the rule's
bright line liability determination: comply and face no liability, or
fail to comply and face certain liability. However, the second result
is that this artificial incentive will not always bind. When circumstances are such that compliance with a categorical rule would generate much too high a risk of social harm, or very high private
compliance costs, the rational actor may ignore the rule's dictates
and do what is actually socially optimal under the circumstances,
even if this means facing certain liability. This latter "self-selection"
effect is important in lessening possible inefficiencies under a categorical rule. The final result developed in this section is similar:
rules are also made more efficient if there is some uncertainty surrounding the supposedly bright-line condition defining compliance,
because this lessens the artificial incentive to comply.
21
See, e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 829, 849-58
(1990) (describing the rules/standards choice from a feminist perspective); Kennedy,
supra note 1, at 360-77 (discussing relationship between formalism and contractarian
theory ofjustice and civil good). I regard the fairness of alternative legal forms, in particular case-by-case, ar post balancing, to be much in need of further investigation, but
such exploration is beyond the scope of this paper. For an interesting approach to the
ethics of "maximization structures" such as balancing, see Robert Nozick, Moral Complication and Moral Structures, 13 NAT'L L.F. 1 (1968).
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To get a better grasp on these results, consider a set of stylized
facts drawn from the famous Goodman 22 and Pokora23 opinions, written by Justices Holmes and Cardozo respectively. To recall, Holmes
attempted in Goodman to crystallize a categorical rule requiring a
driver approaching a railroad track to stop, look, and if necessary
get out of his car and look to ascertain the presence of a train on the
track. 24 In Pokora, Cardozo virtually eliminated the Goodman rule,
saying that there clearly were circumstances under which getting out
of the car would be "futile, and sometimes even dangerous." 25 Getting out of the car might be dangerous when the driver would need
to leave his car on a curve, or when the train was traveling so quickly
that it emerged into view only after the driver turned his back to
walk back to his car. While admitting that one could indeed imagine a "roadbed so level and unbroken that getting out will be a
gain," 26 Cardozo noted that "[e]ven then the balance of advantage
depends on many circumstances and can be easily disturbed," 27 and
concluded as a general matter that "[e]xtraordinary situations may
not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the common place or normal." 28 He therefore returned to
the jury the question of what is suitable for travelers at difficult train
crossings.
Let us simplify somewhat by varying the Goodman and Pokora situation and supposing that the driver is approaching a bicycle crossing. Suppose also that under Justice Holmes's bright-line rule, the
automobile driver will be judged guilty of negligence if he fails to
stop, look, and get out of his car. Clearly there will be some circumstances, perhaps such as those in Goodman, where getting out of the
car will in fact be the optimal thing to do. There may be other circumstances, however, where doing less would be optimal, such as in
Cardozo's example of crossing on a corner. In that situation, getting out of the car to look for bicycles may indeed lower the
probability of a collision with a bicycle, but only by increasing the
probability of an equally serious accident with another car by an
even greater amount. Conversely, there may be some crossings.
where the driver should use even more care than required by
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. Goodman actually contained-ih the qualification only if
one "cannot be sure otherwise"-a balancing inquiry. Id. But as subsequently interpreted, and as characterized by Cardozo in Pokora, the Goodman holding became a brightline rule: stop, look, and get out of the car and look. For purposes of analysis, I adopt
this interpretation of Goodman.
25
Pokora, 292 U.S. at 104.
26 Id. at 105.
22
23
24

27

Id.

28

Id. at 105-06.
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Holmes's rule, perhaps by taking another route entirely, proceeding
more slowly before approaching an obstructed part of the road, or
pulling entirely off the road to get a better view.
. If the legal process never erred in determining what a driver
actually did at bicycle crossings, and ifjudges applied the Holmesian bright-line rule with unflinching rigidity, then drivers would
have too strong an incentive to comply with the rule. Even if getting
out of the car creates a higher risk of an accident than staying inside,
in this error free, rule-bound world, the driver guarantees himself
no liability by complying, a benefit which can encourage him to take
the more costly step of getting out of the car. On the other hand,
there is no incentive for the actor to do more than the rule requires,
because he is completely insulated from liability by just barely
complying.
There are, however, natural limits on the incentive to comply
with the bright-line rule. The rule may well dictate behavior which
is optimal under average or typical circumstances. But when circumstances are far from typical, the real costs and benefits of alternative choices are likely to be so far from what is assumed by the
rule that the driver will rationally disobey it. If the driver knows that
there is very little risk of a collision, and faces very high costs from
stopping and getting out of his car-as, for example, in an emergency situation-then he will disobey the rule and proceed less cautiously than the "stop, look and get out" rule commands. It may be
better to bear the cost of liability than the cost of avoiding liability.
If, on the other hand, the driver knows that not even stopping
and getting out will be of much avail, because of the peculiarly obstructed nature of the particular intersection, then he may be even
more careful than the rule requires and abandon the route entirely.
In this case, the driver could avoid liability by merely complying, but
he could not avoid the other costs associated with the accident. By
being more careful than the rule requires, the driver dramatically
lowers the probability of an accident, which in turn lowers the
probability that he will bear the litigation expenses and other uncompensated costs associated with the occurrence of an accident
29
and the subsequent liability action.
The argument in this example establishes some general points.
Actors will have, in general, too strong an incentive to comply with a
29 In general, a potential victim would want to use even more care than that required by a clear rule because the victim will suffer significant uncompensated loss in the
event of an accident even if he is found free of fault. An injurer or defendant will in
general also suffer uncompensated losses even if he complies with a bright-line rule: he
may be sued, because victims are unsure of compliance, and have to bear significant
administrative costs.
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bright-line rule. However, when circumstances are such that compliance generates either very high private costs or a very high
probability of an accident, then actors "self-select" and do not comply; that is, they reveal the fact that circumstances are unusual and
compliance non-optimal by failing to comply.3 0 They will undercomply-do less than required by the bright-line rule-when circumstances are such that the private cost of compliance is unusually
high. They will overcomply-do more than required by the brightline rule-when mere compliance is much too dangerous and when
they foresee significant uncompensated expenditures attending any
accident. Thus, self-selection through overcompliance is most likely
when actors are sued even when they comply (or do more than comply) and suit is costly, or when the actor suffers uncompensable
damages when an accident occurs. In either of these cases, the actor
suffers significant loss when an accident occurs, and he therefore
has an incentive to reduce the probability of an accident even
though he is not liable for the damage he does to others.
2.

Fairness,Efficiency, and the Instability of Rules

From the preceding argument, it follows that a bright-line rule
may be most efficient when it seems to judges to be most unfair and
irrational. By "unfair" and "irrational" I mean underinclusive and
overinclusive. Judges may perceive as unfair a bright-line rule that
holds people liable even when they behaved optimally, and exculpates people even though they behaved suboptimally. I have just
argued that when compliance with a bright-line rule is much too
costly (in private terms), rational actors will make the socially correct choice and undercomply. But by undercomplying, rational actors incur liability even though they behaved optimally. When sued,
such an actor may defend by calling attention to the lack of fit between the purposes underlying the bright-line rule and the rule; she
may appeal to the court's sense that the rule, as applied in her case,
is arbitrary, because it pepnalizes conduct which is consistent with the
purposes underlying the rule.
To see the potential conflict between judicial perceptions of
fairness and efficiency in starkest relief, suppose now that circumstances are either "normal"-such that complying with the rule is
30 The self-selection idea is essentially that individuals reveal private information
regarding what "type" of persons they are through the choices they make. The idea is
central to contemporary economic theory. SeeJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 142-62 (1988); Russell Cooper, On Allocative Distortionsin Problems of SelfSelection, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 568 (1984); Eric Maskin &John Riley, Monopoly with Incomplete
Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 171 (1984). For an application of these models to the
determination of optimal contract default rules, see Jason Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990).
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optimal-or "emergency"-such that complying with the rule
would be much too costly to the actor. In such a world, the rule
creates perfect incentives: actors comply under normal circumstances (as they should), and they undercomply in emergency circumstances (as they also should). The rule could be perceived to be
grossly unfair, however, in that it essentially penalizes socially desirable behavior.
Perceptions of fairness and efficiency need not conflict, but
when they do not, the rule will often be both inefficient and unfair.
Paradoxically, this will occur when the rule is neither grossly overinclusive nor underinclusive, when, that is, it seems to "fit" pretty well
most of the time. When circumstances are almost "normal," compliance with the rule is almost socially best, and will clearly be privately preferred because of the safe harbor afforded to those who
comply. But some who comply should have done more, and some
should have done less. Plaintiffs will complain about the defendant
who has done too little, and say that the rule is underinclusive, that
it fails to catch all the guilty within its net. Defendants will say that
the rule is overinclusive, requiring more of them than is truly consistent with the purpose underlying the rule. And both will be correct.
Thus, even assuming that the legal process is perfect at finding
facts and applying rules to facts, the bright-line rule will be unstable
and hence uncertain. The rule will be unstable because both efficiency-minded and fairness-minded judges will find it inconsistent
with its underlying purpose. The efficiency-minded judge should
worry most about rules which fit quite well but not perfectly; rules
distort only on the informational margin, where circumstances are
such that legal liability, not true social cost, determines private
choice. Conversely, a fairness-minded judge may be most concerned about rules that fit badly, in the sense that private costs are
often much higher than the rule supposes; such rules will often penalize conduct that is consistent with the purpose underlying the
rule. As for the judge who is concerned with both efficiency and
fairness, he should find almost all bright-line rules obnoxious.
Thus, all three of our judicial types will object to a bright-line
rule and will be tempted to engraft exceptions upon it. Exceptions
may be explicit, in the form of excuses (e.g., "compliance waived
under emergency conditions"). Or, as the Realists persuasively
demonstrated, unstated exceptions can be created by reading the
rule's purpose into its application: if stopping and getting out of the
car would clearly have been the wrong thing to do, the judge can say
that the driver "constructively" left the car by rolling down her window. Ifjudges are very good at deciding when to bend the rule (i.e.,
at deciding when the driver did the correct thing by not leaving the
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car), or it is very costly to persuade judges to bend the rule, then
bending the rule may bring added fairness to the rule without harming the incentives it creates. For suppose that it is costly to claim
and litigate an exception. Then by undercomplying and claiming an
exception, the actor trades off lower compliance costs for higher litigation costs. If the cost of claiming an exception is high enough, the
exception will be self-enforcing in the sense that it will only be
truthfully claimed: only those actors who faced circumstances under
which compliance was not optimal will undercomply and claim that
circumstances were exceptional.3 Similarly, ifjudges are very accurate in determining whether circumstances were exceptional, then
the rational actor will only claim the exception if his claim is true,
since to make a false claim entails additional litigation cost but
brings certain defeat.
From this, it would seem that exceptions motivated by judicial
perceptions of fairness have a greater chance of being self-enforcing
than exceptions motivated by efficiency. To see this, recall that the
efficiency-minded judge should be most concerned about marginal
cases, where circumstances were marginally different than in the
"normal" or "typical" case envisioned by the bright-line rule. 32 But
it may be difficult for judges to achieve a high degree of accuracy in
making such determinations; it may be difficult to tell whether circumstances were really slightly different than usual. The fairnessminded judge, by contrast, should want to create an exception to
the rule not in marginal cases but in cases where circumstances were
extreme, circumstances in which the actor will do the correct thing
but be penalized by the bright-line rule. It may be much easier to
decide accurately whether circumstances were extreme-constituting, for example, an "emergency"-than to decide whether they
were a bit different than usual. If this is so, then the fairness-motivated exception may be self-enforcing, while the efficiency-motivated exception is not.
3.

Uncertainty and Incentives Under a Rule

If an exception to a bright-line rule is not self-enforcing because the legal process is unable to perfectly determine whether the
exception should apply, then the superficially clear bright-line rule
will be uncertain, and perhaps substantially so. Provided, however,
that this uncertainty is not too great, the exception should generally
improve incentives under the rule. Consider first the decision
This assertion is demonstrated more formally in Appendix A.
To the extent that the efficiency-minded judge is also aware of any administrative
cost savings under the rule, the judge will be more reluctant to inquire into such marginal variations in circumstance.
31
32
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whether to undercomply-to take less care than the rule dictates.
Uncertainty cuts the incentive to comply with a bright-line rule, because compliance may lead to liability, and noncompliance to no liability. Costly compliance brings fewer benefits in terms of reduced
expected liability, whereas undercomplying brings the immediate
benefit of lower costs but does not entail certain liability. Thus, as
judges of either stripe blur the bright-line rule by creating exceptions when the rule seems at odds with economic reality, they
weaken the incentive to comply with the rule, and increase the
number of cases in which actors do the socially correct thing by
undercomplying. 33
Uncertainty also makes compliance with a bright-line rule a
much less safe harbor from liability. This increases the incentive to
do more than comply, to take more precautions, or to take precautions even when the rule ostensibly says precautions need not be
taken. But a small chance that the facts will be incorrectly determined, or the compliance category bent so that liability could attach
even if the actor actually complied with the rule, will actually improve incentives under the rule. For instance, if there is a tendency
for courts to err in determining the ex ante presence of a certain fact
x that triggers a duty to take care, then the actor may have an incentive to take care when x is "almost" true and there is a large chance
that the court will find a duty. But when x is "almost" true it may be
that some care is socially optimal, so what the bend in the rule encourages is in fact consistent with the purpose underlying the rule.
Indeed, under reasonable assumptions about the legal process
of rule application, it is highly unlikely that even an uncertain and
fuzzy bright-line rule will cause the actor to do more than the rule
34
superficially requires when doing more is not socially desirable.
For uncertainty in the application of a bright-line rule to cause socially undesirable overcompliance there must be not just a higher
probability of escaping liability by overcompliance, but an increase
large enough to offset the fact that the probability of liability is already low when the actor just barely complies. Put somewhat more
33
For a formal analysis of the effect of uncertainty on compliance with a bright-line
rule, seeJason Johnston, Rules versus Balancing: Incentives for Primary Behavior (Jan.
1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Cornell Law Review); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error,Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 99 (1989). See also Formalism, supra note 1, at 539-48. In that article, Professor
Schauer discusses the determinants of a categorical rule's predictability or certainty, and
argues that the key to understanding the relationship between "ruleness" and predictability is whether allowing the legal decisionmaker to determine the rule's purpose "injects a possibility of variance substantially greater than that involved in giving a
decisionmaker jurisdiction solely to determine whether some particular is or is not"
within the rule's category. Id. at 541.
34
I demonstrate this assertion more rigorously in Johnston, supra note 33.
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simply, if the rule retains any of its "ruleness," then compliance
means a more or less safe harbor. For this reason, the fuzziness in
the harbor's border should usually encourage extra caution only
when circumstances warrant extra caution. For fuzziness to encourage extra caution even when extra caution is not warranted, the
safe harbor must have largely disappeared, which means the rule has
become exceptionally uncertain and arbitrary in application, not just
blurry around the edges.
4.

Uncertainty and the Collapse of Rules

Even under an uncertain rule, there is still a chance that those
who correctly disobey the rule will be found liable, and that those
who incorrectly obey the rule (instead of doing more) will be found
not liable. Exceptions decrease the incentive to comply, but in the
very process of applying the exceptions, judges will see even more
clearly that the rule itself is both overinclusive and underinclusive.
In all likelihood, they will see even more cases in which the rule
itself seems to be unfair or inefficient. This will be particularly so if
litigants tend to pursue most vigorously those cases in which the
rule does not fit well and an exception seems more in accord with
the rule's underlying purpose.3 5 If judges learn about the brightline rule primarily from the sample of cases brought before them,
36
but do not correct for the selection bias inherent in that sample,
then they will overemphasize its unfairness and inefficiency. Moreover, the larger her volume of cases, the sooner may the judge see a
sufficient number of cases in which the rule does not fit to become
confident that the rule must bejettisoned. The larger the volume of
cases, therefore, the more frequently may bright-line rules be
37
abolished.
35
George Priest has found substantial evidence that cases which go to trial are in
fact those where the outcome is most uncertain. See George L. Priest, Measuring Legal
Change, 3J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 193 (1987); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection
of DisputesforLitigation, 13 J. LEGAL ST-UD. 1 (1984). This evidence is consistent with my
assumption that difficult cases at the "edge" of legal doctrine are most likely to be litigated and eventually appealed. It is also consistent with the hypothesis that inefficient
legal rules are most often challenged. SeeJohn Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); George Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul Rubin, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
36 This is an important assumption, for ifjudges corrected for the sample selection
bias, judicial learning would be unaffected by legal form. In assuming that judges do not
make this correction, I am obviously placing some limits on judicial rationality. Moreover, I assume that judges either do not acquire or do not apply significant information
from outside the legal process. With extra-legal learning, the effect I identify could be
muted significantly, but then the biases and limitations of extra-legal learning would
need to be carefully considered. While interesting, exploration of such effects is beyond
the scope of this Article.
37 Ehrlich and Posner apply a similar sequential sampling model ofjudicial learn-

1991]

LEGAL FORM

357

Ironically, efficiency-minded judges may be more likely to destroy bright-line rules than are fairness-minded judges. 3 8 This is because an efficiency-minded judge should create exceptions and bend
the rule in more difficult, more marginal cases, and therefore inject
greater uncertainty into the process of applying the rule than would
a fairness-minded jurist. With greater uncertainty, the efficiencyminded jurist will be quicker to eschew the bright-line rule entirely.
Still, on this general theory, any judge who learns primarily
from the sample of cases she actually sees will become persuaded by
those cases in which a rule is applied that outcomes under the rule
do not correspond closely to the outcomes that the purpose underlying the rule dictates. To get a better fit between general purpose
and individual outcome, the judge may well be tempted to eschew
the bright-line rule in favor of case-by-case balancing. But as we
shall see in the next section, balancing, too, weighs its own
opposition.
C.

Case-by-Case Balancing: Static Incentives

Under balancing, the driver in our Goodman and Pokora example
is held liable only if the legal decisionmaker determines that, given
the costs and benefits of alternative choices, the driver failed to take
reasonable care at the intersection. In an ideal world, where the
legal decisionmaker does* not err in determining both what the
driver did and what was reasonable care under the circumstances,
balancing creates perfect incentives. It has the clarity of a brightline rule but perfect flexibility: compliance is defined precisely as
optimal conduct in a particular situation. There is no incentive to
do more than is really optimal, because the probability of liability
can be lowered to zero simply by doing the optimal thing. There is
a strong incentive not to do less, because doing less entails certain
liability.3 9 Thus judges would always choose an ideal case-by-case
ing, but reach radically different conclusions about the dynamics of legal form. Ehrlich
& Posner, supra note 5, at 262-70. I discuss and compare their results infra at Part III.
38 The qualification here is added because an efficiency-minded judge's perception
that the rule has lower administrative costs than does balancing will make her reluctant
to abandon a rule for balancing.
39 There is thus a sharp discontinuity in expected legal liability under a perfect
balancing test: the actor's liability drops from full to zero if the action is optimal. While
disagreeing (primarily because of differing models of causation) about the significance
of the discontinuity, both Mark Grady and Robert Cooter emphasize the incentive effects of this discontinuity. See Robert D. Cooter, EconomicAnalysis of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 82-89 (1982) [hereinafter EconomicAnalysis of Punitive Damages]; Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1526-30 (1984); Robert D.
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 711 (1985); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YAL LJ. 799
(1983); Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IowA L. REV. 363
(1984).
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balancing over an inherently imperfect and inflexible bright-line
rule. Ideal balancing sends a perfect, clear signal for behavior, and
never attaches liability except when doing so is consistent with the
purpose underlying liability.
The legal process is not perfect, however. Facts are found with
error; decisionmakers differ in how they interpret a vague standard
such as "reasonable" care and how they balance the costs and benefits of alternative private choices. Uncertainty of this sort can cause
40
a balancing test to send either too weak or too strong a signal.
Actors may cut their own costs and do less than is "reasonable"
under the circumstances, because they know that they may be found
not liable even though they failed to behave reasonably. They might
do the opposite, however, and behave too carefully in an attempt to
lower the probability that the legal decisionmaker will incorrectly
find that they have failed to behave reasonably.
Recent theoretical work has demonstrated that whether an uncertain balancing test underdeters or overdeters depends on the
amount of error in determining what the actor did and whether her
behavior complied with the general standard. 4 1 In general, if the
legal decisionmaker is quite accurate at finding facts and deciding
what was reasonable, then the uncertain balancing test will probably
overdeter by a small or moderate degree. Paradoxically, under
plausible assumptions, this overdeterrence effect is most likely to
occur when circumstances are such that a moderate level of care
should have been taken. This happens if the legal decisionmaker is
most accurate in determining facts and balancing costs and benefits
when circumstances are extreme-for example, in emergencies necessitating either very little or utmost care-but least accurate in the
42
grey zone of typical circumstances.
This kind of differential accuracy is in fact implied by reason40

For rigorous demonstrations of this result, see S.

SHAVELL,

supra note 9; Richard

Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
279 (1986).

41

See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 40.

42 For a plausible formal model of the legal process which rigorously establishes
this result, seeJohnston, supra note 9, at 141. I assume that evidence is an informative
signal of what the actor actually did, in the sense that the likelihood function (the

probability of observing a particular evidence type given the defendant's actual conduct)
exhibits the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property. From this monotone likelihood
ratio assumption it follows that if the defendant's conduct is bounded both below and
above, then evidence must become a perfectly informative signal of conduct at either

extreme. If this is not so, then the monotone likelihood ratio property must be violated.
In more general models, where conduct is not bounded, but the monotone likelihood
ratio assumption is made, the signal becomes perfectly informative for limiting realizations. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELLJ. EcON. 324, 328-29
(1982); Paul Milgrom, Good News andBad News: Representation Theorems andApplications, 12
BELLJ. ECON. 380 (1981).
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able assumptions about the legal process. Both factual evidence
and opinion as to what is "reasonable" may be most clear in extreme situations, and most ambiguous under typical circumstances.
Juries and judges will likely agree on the reasonableness of driving
at what would ordinarily be an unreasonably fast speed in order to
get a sick child to the hospital. Similarly, there will often be clear
proof of an emergency, such as severe weather, that necessitates
either not driving or driving with extreme caution. But proof of
what constitutes reasonable speed under normal circumstances may
be much more uncertain. Juries and judges may disagree over the
reasonableness of driving 70 miles per hour on a clear highway, and
the proof they are asked to consider in assessing the reasonableness
of 70 miles per hour may be made up of complex expert opinion
and highway safety studies. But in deciding whether 80 miles per
hour was justified by an emergency, however, they may need to hear
only simple testimony telling what the emergency was. And in deciding whether a driver should even have been out on the highway,
they may need only to recall the state of the weather that night.43
These examples bring out a critical general feature of jury-administered balancing tests: juries decide only those cases in which
the judge has decided that some reasonable jury could find either
for or against liability. Juries thus evaluate conduct within the grey
area, conduct the social utility of which reasonable people could dispute. It is this moderate, bounded uncertainty that causes at least
some overdeterrence. On this theory, the balancing test should
thus induce optimal care under extreme circumstances, when there
is little or no uncertainty over what was and what should have been
done, but too much care under normal or average circumstances,
when there is reasonable disagreement about what constitutes optimal care.
D.

Rules, Balancing, and A Dynamic Theory of Form
1.

Uncertainty and Static Incentives

We now have two important points of comparison between
43 The structure and enforcement of simple tort rules create precisely the sorts of
exceptions I discuss here. Breach of a criminal statute requiring a particular level of care
is generally held to be negligence per se. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126
N.E. 814 (1920); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS]. However, the defense may raise an excuse such as an emergency as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987
(1939); Bassey v. Mistrough, 88 A.D.2d 894, 450 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1982). Moreover, compliance with such a statute does not necessarily immunize an actor from liability, so that
exceptional circumstances mandating greater than normal care are also considered. See
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra, § 36.
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rules and balancing. The first point relates to incentives. Suppose
again a bright-line rule that requires conduct that is optimal under
typical or average circumstances. The rule creates too strong an incentive to comply when circumstances are close to the average, but
does not affect incentives under unusual circumstances. In commonly occurring, nearly average circumstances, the rule sometimes
overdeters and sometimes underdeters (because compliance is
sometimes too little and sometimes too much). If not too great,
uncertainty improves incentives under the rule, by blurring the artificial incentive to comply. And as we showed earlier, only an extremely arbitrary and uncertain rule is likely to induce socially
undesirable excess care.
By contrast, uncertainty, if not too great, causes a balancing test
to overdeter when circumstances are roughly average. If, therefore,
we think rules, despite their exceptions and uncertainty, retain significant ruleness; and if we think balancing tests are uncertain but
still roughly on target; then, in what may well be the most frequently
occurring situations, an uncertain balancing test overdeters while an
uncertain rule neither systematically overdeters nor underdeters.4
2.

Uncertainty and the Chaotic Dynamics of Form

A second, potentially even more important point of comparison
between rules and balancing is the relationship between behavioral
incentives, case selection, and legal change. As I just argued, cases
involving extreme situations should involve little uncertainty in a
balancing regime and should be quickly settled if brought. Most
cases in a balancing regime will arise out of typical circumstances,
and involve a defendant who took slightly too much care (i.e., did
slightly more than was reasonable). These cases will be decidedby a
jury, perhaps after a judge determines that they do indeed fall
within the grey area of reasonably debatable conduct. Ajudge overseeing ajury-administered balancing regime will therefore observe a
sample of cases reflecting underlying circumstances that are typical
or average. 4 5 Moreover, our judge may observe that most of the
44
For a more formal and complete analysis of the comparative effect of uncertainty
on rules and balancing, seeJohnston, supra note 33. Despite the great literature on rules
and standards and legal determinacy, there have been very few attempts to closely analyze the different kinds of uncertainty under rules and balancing. For an example, see
Formalism, supra note 1, at 542 ("a rule-bound decisionmaker, precluded from taking into
account certain features of the present case, can never do better but can do worse than a
decisionmaker seeking-the optimal result for a case through rule-free decision.").
45
My model thus rests on the insight that legal form alters the world to which
forms are applied, so that judicial observations about the world cannot be separated
from judicial decisions based on those observations. In short, decision affects observation, but observation affects decision. For a fascinating recent article making a similar
but more general point based on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, see Laurence H.
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defendants she sees made substantial efforts to comply with the underlying standard of reasonableness and may indeed have succeeded; judgments that they did not are made by the jury, not the
judge.
Now imagine the reaction of our hypothetical judge as the vol-

ume of cases is steadily increased. She will see more and more typical cases involving optimal or even supra-optimal care. It may take

the judge little time to become persuaded 46 that within the vague
balancing test lies a rule, a rule appropriate for the vast majority of

cases that now take up judicial time and attention and consume
substantial public resources only to be decided, often incorrectly, by

a jury. Dissatisfied with balancing, the judge may adopt instead a
bright-line rule defining optimal conduct under average circum47
stances.
Recall, however, that a bright-line rule also tends to select cases
that illustrate its inadequacies. Defendants who have optimally undercomplied because circumstances were extreme and the private
cost of care was too high to justify full compliance will try to persuade the judge that it is unfair to hold them liable. And in other
less extreme circumstances plaintiffs will complain that the defendant's compliance should not give it a safe harbor, because the defendant should have overcomplied. In either event, judges may be
pulled toward balancing and away from the rule: 48 under extreme
Tribe, The Curvatureof ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1989). Professor Tribe admonished courts to
take account of how the very process of legal "observation" (i.e.,judging)
shapes both the judges themselves and the materials being judged. The
results courts announce-the ways they view the legal terrain and what
they say about it-will in turn have continuing effects that reshape the
nature of what the courts initially undertook to review .... The law is
thus not simply a backdrop against which action may be viewed ... but is
itself an integral part of that action.
Id. at 20.
46
Adherence to precedent also constrains the rate of formal change. Whether
stare decisis is efficient depends on a number of factors, especially the reversibility of
investments. On the general theory of precedent, see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, andEthical
Generalization,in PRECEDENT IN LAW 183 (L. Goldstein ed. 1987); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987); cf Anthony T. Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99
YALE LJ. 1029, 1038-40 (1990). For economic approaches to precedent and legal
change, see Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process,
11J. LEGAL SrUD. 405 (1982); Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the
Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Lewis A. Komhauser,
An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989).
47 This aspect of my theory of formal change parallels the view taken by Holmes
and applied by Ehrlich and Posner. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
48
Friedman offers a similar observation of the tendency for rules to collapse. See
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYsTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 307 (1975);
see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 92-93 (1988) (court
determination of the generality with which a rule is formulated).
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circumstances, both the rule and balancing create optimal incentives, and it may not be apparent to the judge, in a regime of rules,
that balancing may not create such good incentives in marginal
cases. Moreover, balancing may better appeal to the judge's sense
of fairness because ideally, it looks at all the circumstances and
avoids the rule's apparent arbitrariness, asking in each case whether
the defendant behaved reasonably, rather than allowing some defendants who were actually negligent to escape liability while imposing liability on other defendants who actually exercised reasonable
care.
But if rules pull toward balancing and balancing toward rules, it
follows that the formal structure of the law may undergo self-sustaining and potentially endless cyclical changes. 49 Judges may begin
with rules, and then adopt balancing, and revert to rules, and so on.
Moreover, the frequency of change may increase with the volume of
cases. This will happen if the judge changes the form of the law
only after reaching a certain level of confidence that the form needs
to be changed, and this level of confidence depends on the number
of cases the judge has recently observed in which the legal form
seems inadequate.
Finally, it may be impossible to predict changes in form. Form
depends in part on the path of litigated cases, which in turn depends
on the random circumstances which generate cases. A long run of
cases involving typical or average circumstances would tend to solidify a bright-line rule. A string involving unusual circumstances
would weaken it. Many of the most important economic and physical circumstances that figure into human behavior, and therefore
law, are random (consider, for example, the stock market and our
weather). Thus, even if the legal process was not itself random,
legal form would be. On this theory, the path of the law is hardly a
"path" at all: it is a series of non-linear, chaotic jumps from point to
point. 5 0
49

For similar recognition of the oscillation between legal forms, see H.

HART, supra

note 17, at 127; Rules and Standards, supra note 11, at 428-29. A theory of oscillation
between rules and balancing that emphasizes the institutional roles of court and legislature appears in Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577
(1988) (discussed at greater length infra, at subpart III(E)). For an interesting article
presenting several reasons why law should become more uncertain, see Anthony
D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983).
50 My conjecture is that the "population" of alternative legal forms might in some
circumstances exhibit dynamics similar to those in certain biological populations. See
R.M. May, Chaos and the Dynamics of Biological Populations, A 413 PROC. ROYAL Soc'Y
LONDON 27 (1987). This assumes a deterministic dynamic, such as those introduced in
ROBERT DEVANEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHAOTIC DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1989);
however, it is possible that the population of legal forms would not exhibit chaotic dynamics. The answer awaits further modelling. Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser
demonstrate, however, that within the context of a stochastic model of legal change with
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III
A

COMPARISON WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTAL THEORIES OF

LEGAL FORM

A.

The Optimal Specificity Approach

Well over a decade has elapsed since the last systematic attempt
51
to analyze the economics of legal form. In an influential article,
Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner examined the optimal level of
specificity in a legal command. Although they did not utilize the
"rules" versus "balancing" terminology I have employed, it is clear
that a specific command in the Ehrlich/Posner model corresponds
to a rule and a general command corresponds to balancing under a
general standard. 52 While there are a number of similarities between their analysis and my own approach, I wish here to briefly
highlight some important differences.
Ehrlich and Posner recognize that even a perfect rule is necessarily overinclusive and underinclusive. They recognize that the
more specific a rule, and the more heterogeneous the world it regulates (or, in my terminology, the more that circumstances vary), the
greater the costs of overinclusion and underinclusion.5 3 Additionally, they recognize that balancing under a general standard will also
involve overinclusion and underinclusion when the legal process is
imperfect. 5 4 But Ehrlich and Posner do not analyze the effect of uncertainty on incentives under a rule, and consequently do not compare rules and balancing under uncertainty. They do, however,
reach a conclusion regarding incentives under an overinclusive rule
which differs from mine. They argue that an overly inclusive rule
will not deter socially valuable violations of the rule, because if the
rule only imposes compensatory damages it amounts simply to "[a]
rule that makes injurers liable for all of their accidents whether or
not they are negligent (strict liability)"; and such a rule "should not
deter them from engaging in behavior that results in nonnegligent
(efficient) accidents, since, by definition, their liability will be less
blind judges, the law will not generally converge to the efficient rule. Robert Cooter &
Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 139 (1980); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Notes on the "Logic" of Legal Change, in THE
LOGIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Baybrooke ed. 1990) (forthcoming).
51 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5. The article is widely cited as "the" economic
theory of legal form. See, e.g., Rules and Standards,supra note 11, at 381 n. 12. Ehrlich and

Posner's economic theory has also been directly applied to various doctrinal areas. See,
e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).

52 Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 5, at 257. These authors use a specified speed limit
to illustrate a "specific command" and a declaration that driving at "unreasonable"
speeds is unlawful to illustrate a "general command."
53
54

Id. at 268.
Id. at 263-65.
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than the benefits they obtain from such activity." 5 5 Our analysis
shows that Ehrlich and Posner are partly correct; if circumstances
are such that compliance with the rule is much too costly, then individuals will disobey the rule and bear liability. But, as a general
statement, their conclusion does not hold. When circumstances differ only slightly from those under which the rule is optimal, people
will comply with the rule solely in order to gain the safe harbor from
liability which compliance provides. This qualification is important
to a general economic theory of legal form, for it shows that overinclusive rules may be inefficient as well as unfair. This qualification
also indicates that such inefficiency only arises in what I have called
marginal cases: cases that are similar to the circumstances underlying the framing of a rule. If there are many such cases, then the
economic case for bright-line rules may be much weaker than is implied by the Ehrlich/Posner analysis.
My theory also yields positive predictions that differ from those
resulting from the Ehrlich/Posner analysis. Ehrlich and Posner
make the static prediction that "rules will be more common (other
things being equal) in areas of homogeneous conduct," 56 where by
"homogeneous conduct" they mean that circumstances determining
what is economically optimal behavior do not vary much. This prediction is based on the argument that "[tihe costs of detailedness
are lower, the more homogeneous the conduct affected; problems
of overinclusion and of underinclusion are less serious."' 5 7 But this
argument does not follow from the body of the Ehrlich/Posner analysis; indeed, it is contradicted by the main thrust of their analysis of
overinclusive rules (with compensatory damages). By comparison,
the theory developed here does imply that the homogeneity of regulated conduct is important to efficiency under a rule, and this implication is nonintuitive: conduct that is radically heterogeneous, in
that the rule is either correct or wildly incorrect, can be efficiently
regulated by the bright-line rule. This is so because actors selfselect and disobey the rule when it is wildly incorrect. But conduct
that is only slightly heterogeneous may be inefficiently regulated by
a bright-line rule, because the rule "binds" and alters choice in situations where it is marginally incorrect.
Perhaps the most dramatic contrast between my model and the
Ehrlich/Posner theory, however, is the dynamic theory of legal
change it suggests. According to my model, even ifjudges care only
about efficiency, their efforts to adapt legal form to what they learn
from the cases they see can generate self-sustaining, repetitive for55
56
57

Id. at 269.

id. at 273.
Id.
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mal change. Legal form should oscillate between precision and generality, between rules and balancing. Ehrlich and Posner also posit
that judges learn from what is essentially a sequential (case) sampling process. 58 They believe, however, that this process of discovery should eventually lead toward more precise rules as judges
become more familiar with the particular legal problem. 59 They
give as an example the law of antitrust, "where over the years more
and more practices have been ruled illegal per se after a period in
which they were judged under a reasonableness standard." 60 With
one caveat, Ehrlich and Posner essentially adapt and apply Justice
Holmes's evolutionary view that, because rules summarize "what
has been learned in the prior adjudications" 6 1 and because judges
learn more and more about the conduct that the law regulates, the
law should become increasingly precise. The caveat is that Ehrlich
and Posner think that the common law process is too slow to keep
up with the demand for legal change brought about by an increasing
volume of economic activity. 62 But Ehrlich and Posner explain that
the demand for legal change has been met by the growth of
rulemaking by legislatures and administrative agencies.6 3 They give
as an example the promulgation of traffic safety codes, which supply
rules of per se negligence in tort law.r 4
On a general level, the Ehrlich/Posner theory obviously differs
dramatically from my model of formal change. Theirs is an optimistic account of evolution toward increased precision and rationality.
In my account, rational decisionmakers induce self-sustaining, potentially chaotic swings between precise rules and general
standards.
Our accounts also differ as positive theories of legal change. In
Part IV, I apply my theory to selected doctrinal issues in tort law.
These applications suggest that my theory accurately describes part
of the process of legal change in this area of the law. The two examples with which Ehrlich and Posner chose to illustrate their theoryper se rules in antitrust and the use of statutory violations to establish negligence per se-illustrate instead my model's explanatory
force. Since Ehrlich and Posner wrote, per se rules in antitrust have
been substantially eroded and replaced by case-by-case balancing of
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects under the rule of rea58

Id. at 279.

59
60

Id. at 266, 273.
Id at 266.

61

Id

62
63

Id. at 279.

64

Id

Id. at 279-80. They hypothesize that agencies and legislatures can change the
law more quickly than courts can because they are not bound by stare decisis.
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son. 6 5 Events in tort law over the last fifteen years also tend to make
ironic their negligence per se example. 6 6 Courts have consistently
refused to make compliance with increasingly detailed regulatory
rules a defense to a common-law negligence action, 67 so that increased regulatory precision has if anything only added to the complexity and uncertainty faced by potential tort defendants by
presenting them with an additional liability hurdle.
B.

Economic Theories of the "Reasonable" Person in a
Heterogeneous World

The economic theory of liability regimes in tort law is now
71
70
quite sophisticated. 6 8 Grady, 69 Posner and Landes, Rubinfeld,
Schwartz, 72 and Shavell 7 3 have recently explored how alternative liability regimes perform in a world where people differ, such that
some people find it more difficult or costly to be careful than does
65 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (deciding
that tying agreements are not always illegal per se); Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that horizontal price fixing is not always illegal
per se provided that a new product is created); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (ruling that vertical non-price restraints are not illegal per se). On these
developments in antitrust, see William Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust. Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221

(1989).
66 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRys § 288C (1965) provided, even during the

time Erhlich and Posner authored their theory, that "[c]ompliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence." Despite an increase in the density and detail of regulatory directives, compliance with
regulatory directives still does not generally (and irrespective of preemption) insulate
the actor from common-law tort liability. See P. HUBER, supra note 8, at 149; Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333-35 (1985).
67 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, reh'g denied,
282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978).
68 Some recent theoretical contributions include Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigmof Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987) (arguing that
an efficient balancing test under uncertainty would involve restrictive liability but large
damages); Marcel Kahan, Causation andIncentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule, 18J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989) (extending earlier work on the effect of uncertainty on incentives under balancing to take explicit account of the definition of causation employed).
69 Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, NondurablePrecautions, and the
Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1988).
70

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT

LAw 123-32 (1987).
71
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of ComparativeNegligence, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 375
(1987). For a more formal analysis with a similar result, see Winand Emons, Efficient
Liability Rules for an Economy With Nonidentical Individuals, Dep't of Econ. Discussion
Paper No. 88-14, U.C. San Diego (1988).
72
Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Definingthe Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO.
LJ. 241 (1989).
73
S. SHAvLL, supra note 9, at 86-91.
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the hypothetical reasonable person used to define reasonable care.
The general result in this literature is that a negligence rule based
on what is optimal for a reasonable person to do may send an incorrect signal for those who are not the reasonable person.7 4 This result parallels my general point on the potential distortion under a
bright-line rule: those whose cost of care is much higher than that
of the reasonable or average person will choose to be negligent because of the excessive cost of their compliance, while those whose
cost of compliance is only slightly higher than average will comply
because of the large benefit from complying with a bright-line rule.
My analysis should be viewed as extending and generalizing this
work on "reasonable" care in a world of heterogeneous individuals.
The insight that individuals may self-select and disobey a bright-line
rule is general, and does not apply solely to a bright-line definition
of reasonable care. I have extended this insight by allowing for the
possibility that the bright-line "reasonable" person rule is fuzzy
around the edges, and by comparing such a fuzzy rule to an inherently fuzzy and uncertain balancing test, thus relating the economic
literature on "reasonable" care in a heterogeneous world to previous work on incentives under an uncertain balancing test. It is this
comparison of fuzzy rules with fuzzy balancing which yields my theory of cyclical legal change. These two final features of my modelthe comparative analysis of how uncertainty affects incentives under
balancing and rules and how incentives in turn affect judicial learning and feed back into legal change-allow us to relate the economic
analysis of form to the traditional post-Realist discussion of form,
for uncertainty and change are at the heart of the traditional debate.
C.

Rules and the Consequentialist Critique

Uncertainty and change are central not just in post-Realist
thinking about form, but also in an increasingly prominent type of
analysis which I will call the consequentialist critique. This viewpoint, perhaps most visible in the work of Richard Epstein, insists
that Realism has left us with a legacy of uncertain ex post balancing
tests, which have destroyed the predictability of legal outcomes and
undermined the market as arbiter of taste and choice. 75 The thrust
74

This result originated in Peter Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.

107 (1974). Robert Cooter's economic theory of punitive damages is built upon a similar model of varying precaution costs. See EconomicAnalysis of PunitiveDamages,supra note
39. A comparable formal analysis appears in Winand Emons &Joel Sobel, On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules When Agents Are Not Identical, Dep't of Econ. Discussion
Paper No. 88-39, U.C. San Diego (1988).
75

See RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABmLTY LAw 14-15 (1980); Rich-

ard A. Epstein, The PoliticalEconomy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 311,
313 (1988); Epstein, supra note 8.
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of this criticism is that clear rules are cheap and easy to administer
and may get things right most of the time, whereas balancing tests
bring only randomness, inaccurate determination of whether conduct conformed to the underlying standard, and incredibly high administrative costs.
A frequent example, put not only by Epstein but by Peter Huber, 7 6 is Dean John Wade's risk-utility test for defective product design. 7 7 Epstein and Huber decry the courts' failure to adopt clear
rules for defective product design. Epstein defends the largely
abandoned patent danger rule, under which there is no liability for
defective design if a product risk is open or obvious, as giving a
"clear, cheap, and correct answer in most cases." 7T The patent danger rule works, he says, because "[t]he distribution of cases along
the latent/patent axis is such that there are few cases when the line
between latent and patent is in doubt." 7 9 Similarly, both Epstein
and Huber argue that compliance with ex ante regulatory rules governing product design should be given more weight in ex post tort
litigation.8 0 Doing so would greatly increase the certainty of tort
adjudication, with little loss in efficiency of product design, provided
81
that the regulatory rules are generally correct.
Part of the difference between the Epstein/Huber analysis and
my own is accounted for by my assumption that there is no bargaining between tort injurer and victim. Epstein's account, by contrast,
emphasizes how the patent danger rule worked to "insure the easy
transmission of information" and enhance private contracting "by
helping consumers make informed choices." 8 2 The patent danger
rule made sure that the manufacturer was liable only when "there
was differential knowledge or access to knowledge between the parties." 8 3 Thus, the manufacturer would be liable for latent defects
that the consumer would have a difficult if not impossible time discovering and pricing, while the consumer would retain liability for
patent defects, and adjust the price she would pay (downward) according to the expected value of the patent risk. In equilibrium, a
patent product risk would therefore be a risk against which the con76

See P. HUBER, supra note 8, at 43.

The risk/utility test for defining an unreasonbly dangerous product under Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) was set out in John W. Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-39 (1973).
78
Epstein, supra note 8, at 474.
79
Id.
77

80

See P. HUBER, supra note 8, at 45-51, 210-15.

81
82

See Huber, supra note 66, at 333-35.
Epstein, supra note 8, at 474.

83

Id.
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sumer was the cheaper cost avoider, since otherwise the manufacturer would eliminate the risk at a cost less than the price increase.
But this contractual argument for the patent/latent categorical
approach rests crucially upon the assumption that the categorical
approach "fits." If the categories do not fit-if, in particular, the
court often finds "patent" a defect which in fact consumers did not
generally perceive-then the rule will systematically underdeter
manufacturers. Consumers will underprice the risks they assume,
because they will be assuming risks they don't perceive. If balancing
is fairly accurate, however, then it may better constrain bargaining
between consumers and manufacturers than does a very imperfect
categorical rule.8 4 It is irrelevant that a very good categorical rule
would better facilitate private bargaining than does a very imperfect
balancing regime. The relevant comparison is between imperfect
balancing and imperfect rules, and this comparison-which is subtle
and complex-is not discussed by Epstein or Huber.
In this imperfect world, market pricing of risk allocated according to the latent/patent distinction will fail to generate optimal incentives. My analysis can then be applied to examine the direct,
nonmarket incentives created by alternative formal regimes.8 5 One
benefit of this analysis is that it reveals considerable ambiguity in
some of the standard arguments about rules and balancing. For example, Epstein's emphasis on administrative cost savings under
bright-line rules fails to recognize the interaction between the optimality of incentives under a rule and the realization of administrative cost savings. Once a risk or set of product risks is labelled as
open and obvious, manufacturers will have little incentive to reduce
that risk even if the risk reduction becomes justified economically.
If injured product users perceive some play in the rule, howeversome chance that judges will recategorize the risk in light of changing economic conditions-then they will often sue when they are
84 This point has very general, and important implications for our understanding of
property rights and the Coase Theorem. SeeJasonJohnston, Bargaining and Form (Oct.
1990) (unpublished manuscript).
85 In a world where parties have perfect information and courts freely enforce contractual modifications and waivers of common-law tort liability, it would be possible to
test the efficiency of alternative formal regimes by looking at how often parties bargained out of the regime's outcomes. Epstein alleges that there was precisely this sort of
empirical confirmation of the efficiency of the latent/patent distinction: "The utter want
of any concern about 'contracting out' of products liability rules, and the complete disinterest in undoing them through legislation is pretty strong evidence of how close the
common law rules once adhered to the social optimum." Epstein, supra note 8, at 474.
But consumers can't contract out of risks which they do not in fact perceive, and courts
have traditionally been extremely wary of contractual attempts to vary tort liability in the
consumer context. So neither of the conditions necessary to the validity of Epstein's
empirical test holds; in other words, if his empirical test is valid, then it is tautologically
SO.
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harmed by the supposedly open and obvious danger, in the hope of
persuading a judge to bend the rule. But then the rule will generate
a supra-optimal risk of both injury and suit. The costs of adjudicating each lawsuit may be quite high, because courts will be asked to
re-examine the rule, not simply apply it. But even if costs in each
adjudication stay low relative to costs under balancing, the rule may
generate higher expected administrative costs-that is, .the cost per
suit multiplied by the probability of harm and suit-because the rule
generates a supra-optimal risk of harm and suit. It may be that balancing would also send an imperfect signal, and induce product
manufacturers to be too careful in design. However, such excess
care lowers the risk of harm and suit and may actually enhance the
expected administrative cost advantage of balancing. The problem
with Epstein's analysis is that it is concerned with the wrong variable: from society's point of view, it is the expected administrative
cost that matters, not the cost per case. If bright-line rules create
bad incentives and increase risk, then they may also increase the
number of lawsuits and thereby dissipate the per lawsuit administrative cost saving.
D.

Theories of Ratchet One-Way Change

Accepting the modem observation that tort law has tended to
move away from rules and toward balancing, Professors James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg,8 6 and Professor Richard Epstein,8 7 have recently hypothesized that the economic interests of
lawyers and their clients dictate that the common law should move
steadily toward increasing vagueness and unspecificity, toward balancing and away from rules. In Professor Epstein's account, lawyers
want a "set of rules of genuine complexity that allows both sides of
the bar to maximize their expected income, measured as the product of the frequency and expense of lawsuits." 8 8 Under balancing
tests such as the risk/utility test, "[d]iscretion is king, and the services of expert lawyers on both sides are indispensable for any
party." 8 9 On Henderson and Eisenberg's view, it is not lawyers but
clients-in particular, plaintiffs-who benefit from increasing complexity and the movement to balancing. They observe a "ratcheteffect," whereby "[o]nce a court replaces a rule with a standard, it is
more difficult to move back to a rule even if, on the substantive mer86 James Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability:
An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 514-16 (1990).
87 Epstein, supra note 75, at 313.

88
89

Id.
Id
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its, such a return seems called for," 90 and hypothesize that "[i]f, as
seems likely, vagueness in tort liability standards tends to favor
plaintiffs, the marginal shift away from rule specificity tends to favor
plaintiffs." 9 '
Epstein's theory leaves unexplained how lawyers can effectively
implement their preference for complexity, if such a preference
exists. A lawyer representing a defendant who complied with a
bright-line rule would not often urge the abolition of the rule; nor
would the attorney for a plaintiff suing a defendant who had clearly
failed to comply. It is far from clear that the adversary process provides a forum in which the expression of such a preference for complexity is viable. 9 2 However, even under Epstein's complexity
hypothesis, it does not follow that lawyers benefit most from sustained, evolutionary movement toward balancing. Rather, a temporal pattern of chaotic swings between rules and balancing would
create more uncertainty for clients, would create more cases, and
would make accurate and timely legal advice even more important
than would sustained evolution toward statically more complex balancing. Thus, dynamic oscillation between static simplicity (rules)
and static complexity (balancing) might make lawyers even better
off. Epstein suggests an intriguing thesis, which warrants further
analysis in the context of the general model I have developed.
Also intriguing is the Henderson and Eisenberg thesis that
plaintiffs benefit most from the movement to balancing. However,
their thesis is dearly incomplete and does not persuasively refute
my theory of chaotic oscillation. Henderson and Eisenberg defend
their theory of plaintiff preference on the grounds that balancing
lets more cases get to thejury, and "[o]nce it is clear that a claim will
reach the trier of fact, the claim gains substantial value and is likely
to be settled." 93 But while more cases are viable and have settlement value under balancing, it is also true that many defendants
would benefit from a move to balancing. Any defendant who would
rationally violate the bright-line rule and pay automatic damages
must be strictly better off under balancing, because there is generally a positive chance of escaping liability under balancing. 94 Thus if
90

Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 515.

91

Id

As Epstein recognizes, it may be much easier for lawyers to achieve their preferences through the legislative process. This raises important issues about the optimality
of legislative reform of tort law and the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny of
such reform. I am exploring these issues in a work in progress. Jason Johnston, Who
Should Reform Tort Law? A Theoretical Perspective On Constitutions and Torts (Mar.
1990) (draft notes on file with the author).
93
Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 515 n.148 (citing Form and Substance,
supra note 11, at 1717-22).
94 This assertion is demonstrated more formally in Appendix B.
92

372

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:341

a rule truly is ill-fitting, both plaintiffs and defendants may benefit
from its abolition. Moreover, it is far from clear that, ex ante, plaintiffs generally benefit from a more costly and more uncertain regime. This relates to Professor Epstein's point. It may be that, net
of lawyer's fees and other costs, many plaintiffs actually get a smaller
net recovery under balancing than they would under a rule. It is
also not clear that more plaintiffs recover something, since the direct and temporal costs of litigation under balancing may discourage many plaintiffs from bringing suit. Who benefits from balancing
is thus a complex and difficult question, and it seems very possible
that there will be complex and shifting client interests in formal
change, a pattern arguably more consistent with fluctuation than
with evolution.
E.

Oscillation and Institutional Differentiation

Perhaps the most systematic prior theory of formal oscillation is
Professor Carol Rose's account of the oscillation between rules and
standards in property law. 95 Surveying changes in the formal characteristics of the law of residential purchase and sale, mortgages,
and land sale recording, she persuasively demonstrates oscillation
between "crystals" (categorical rules in my terminology) and "mud"
(balancing tests).96 Her demonstration of oscillation in property law
calls into question the established economic understanding, which
says that dear, crystalline property rights are essential to efficient
exchange of such rights. 9 7 Her explanation of oscillation between
crystals and mud, however, rests in part on a theory of institutional
differentiation which contrasts quite clearly with my theory of endogenous oscillation in judge-made law.
In Rose's account, crystalline rules emerge to facilitate exchange between rational, well-informed strangers, but are then
muddied by courts, who fear that strict enforcement of such rules
would lead to forfeiture or disproportionate loss. Rose observes
that this prospect might well force parties to be "too careful, and try
to live up to their obligations even when circumstances changed
radically, and when everyone would really be better off if someone
defaulted." 9 This effect is a version of the general tendency for
95

Rose, supra note 49.

Id. at 580-93.
97 For a summary of various economic theories of the clarity of rights and exchange, see id at 590-95. For a theoretical demonstration that efficiency in exchange
may instead require muddy property rights, see J. Johnston, supra note 84.
98
Rose, supra note 49, at 599. As Rose notes, disproportionate loss also means
disproportionate gain for the person on the other side of the property entitlement, and
such gain could create a moral hazard problem by creating an incentive to encourage
default or failure. Id.
96
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strict categorical rules to overdeter. In any event, in Rose's theory it
is through the decisions of judges, "who see everything ex post" 99
and "lean ever so slightly to mud, in order to save the fools from
forfeiture at the hands of scoundrels," 1 0 0 that crystal rules become
muddied and give way to balancing. 1° 1 Crystals, conversely, are demanded at the ex ante stage, "when private parties make contracts
0 2 so
with strangers or when legislatures make prospective law,"'
that while "judicial solutions veer towards mud rules.., it is legislatures that are more apt to join with private parties as 'rulemakers'
with a tilt towards crystal. ' 103 Thus, the circular pattern between
crystals and mud is, on Rose's view, a pattern between ex ante
rulemaking by legislatures and private contracting parties, and ex
post muddying by judges.""'
It is possible to find within tort law a similar oscillation between
judicial muddying and legislative crystallization.' 0 5 But it is also
possible to find instances ofjudicial oscillation between crystals and
mud in tort doctrine.10 6 Moreover, the recent tendency in tort law
is for judges to pull back from open-ended balancing and move toward rules.' 0 7 Thus, within tort law (where the pressure for clarity
and the time frame for decisionmaking is somewhat different than
within property law), my model ofjudicial oscillation is an increasingly accurate descriptive account.
Perhaps more significant, however, is the area of normative inquiry opened up by the contrast between Professor Rose's theory of
formal oscillation and mine. It may be, as Professor Rose posits,
difficult for courts, in the expost adjudicatory posture, to look back to
99

Id at 603.

100
101

Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 604.

102
103
104

Id

For example, in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308
(1971), Colorado's Supreme Court abolished the common-law categorical scheme of
landowner liability-a crystal-in favor of an open-ended, foreseeability-based balancing test. The Colorado legislature then attempted to restore the categorical commonlaw system by enacting new legislation. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-115 (1986). In
testimony either to the intricacies of the common-law categorical scheme, or the legislature's incompetence, the legislature's attempt was declared unconstitutional in Gallegos
v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989) because it imposed a higher standard of care with
respect to licensees than invitees.
106 See, e.g., Koske v. Townsend Eng'g, 551 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1990). In that case, the
Indiana Supreme Court overruled Bemis Co. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) and held that Bemis's adoption of the open and obvious
rule on defective product design was inconsistent with the 1978 Indiana Product Liability Act. Thus in Indiana, judges adopted and then jettisoned the categorical open and
obvious rule.
107 See section IV(D)(1), infra.
105
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discern optimal ex ante rules, simply because the litigation process
does not provide courts with adequate information or the incentive
to obtain it. But legislation is informed by an equally peculiar perspective, that of competing interest groups. Judges may encounter
legislation that risks forfeiture, not only because well-meaning legislators seeking to serve the public interest have failed to anticipate
the scoundrel's trap for the fool, but also because the legislators
have acted as the scoundrel's agents. While the topic is beyond the
scope of this paper, it would be interesting to inquire into the impact of alternative judicial attitudes regarding statutory interpretation on both the form of legislation and the rules versus balancing
dynamic process.
IV
SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

My analysis of legal form has both normative and positive implications, and implications for both static efficiency and dynamic
change. In this Part, I make these implications more concrete by
applying the theory to selected doctrinal issues in the law of torts.
Since my point is to illustrate the theory, rather than to exhaustively
analyze doctrine, I have organized the discussion around the theoretical implications which each doctrinal issue illustrates.
A.

The Static Inefficiency of Rules: The Patent Danger Rule

The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A makes a product
manufacturer strictly liable for product-related harm only if the
plaintiff establishes that the product was sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."' 0 8 This
general test has been accepted in every jurisdiction,10 9 but courts
use different tests for determining whether a product design is defective and unreasonably dangerous. This split can be traced to ambiguity in the original comment i to Section 402A, which says both
that the defective condition of the product must make it "unreasonably dangerous" 1 10 to the user or consumer and that it must be
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it."' l As applied to the
question of whether a design is defective, comment i's apparent requirement of a collective determination both of unreasonable risk
108
109

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

402A (1965).

For an historical account of Section 402A's judicial reception, see George L.
Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
11
Id.
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and risk beyond normal consumer contemplation has yielded as
many as four different approaches. 112
Of these approaches, by far the dominant is Dean John Wade's
risk-utility test.1 13 This is perhaps the best example in all of contemporary tort law of a jury-administered balancing test. Wade's test
calls for the jury to determine whether a product design is abnormally dangerous by considering seven factors, the gist of which consideration is that the jury should balance the product's utility to
society against its risk, in light of the availability of substitute products, the feasibility of making the product safer while retaining its
usefulness, and the ability of consumers to know about and to take
precautions against risk. On the theory that the product manufacturer is typically best informed regarding the risk-utility test factors,
one court has gone so far as to shift to the manufacturer the burden
of proving that its product was not defective under the risk-utility
14

test. 1

A jury-administered risk-utility test contrasts perhaps most
sharply with what has become known as the patent danger rule.1 15
As Henderson and Twerski lucidly describe it, the patent danger
rule "declares that any design-related hazard that is, or should be,
obvious to a reasonable product user cannot be the basis of a valid
claim of defective design."1 16 Once the majority view, the patent
danger rule evolved when negligence was the standard for design
defect liability; but the rule was viewed by many courts as inconsistent with the movement to strict liability, and is now followed only
17
in a minority of jurisdictions.'
The original reason for adopting the patent danger rule was
clearly stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Campo v.
Scofield,'111 where the plaintiff's hands were caught in an unguarded
onion-topping machine. The court said that, with respect to a risk
of this sort:
112

See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 684-91, 365 N.W.2d 176, 182-86

(1984); see also Priest, supra note 8, at 209-17.
113
114

Wade, supra note 77, at 837-39.
See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225

(1978) (shifting the burden to defendant to show that product is not defective merely
upon the plaintiff's prima facie showing that her injury was proximately caused by the
product's design); see alsoJames A. Henderson, Jr., RenewedJudicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservationof an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773
(1979); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreward: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CAUF. L. REv.
435, 468 (1979) (criticizing Barker as requiring that every design defect case be decided

by a jury applying the vague risk-utility formula).
115 On this contrast, see Epstein, supra note 8,at 474-75.
116

JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS

AND PROCESS 542 (1987).

117
118

See id at 542-43.
301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
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the manufacturer has [a] right to expect that such persons will do
everything necessary to avoid.., contact, for the very nature of
the article gives notice and warning of the consequences to be expected, of the injuries to be suffered. [There is] no duty to render
a machine or other article "more" safe-as long as the danger to
be avoided is obvious and patent to all. 119
This justification for immunizing the manufacturer from liability can
easily be viewed as rooted in efficiency concerns. It may be that consumers and product users generally are aware of and take inexpensive precautions against obvious product dangers, and that, given
such precautions, no further manufacturer design modifications are
economically justified.
To take a recent example, assume that the risk that a typical
motorcycle rider's legs will be injured if she is involved in a lowspeed, angled impact collision is sufficiently clear that she will take
extra precautions against such a collision, so that it would be ineffi1 20
cient for the manufacturer to install crash bars on the motorcycle.
If the manufacturer knows that the patent danger rule will be applied to preclude liability, then it may have no incentive to put crash
bars on. This will generate very little inefficiency, however, if the
proportion of careful riders is high enough, for, by assumption,
manufacturer precautions are economically justified only given that
the rider is not careful. The categorical obvious danger rule will
also minimize administrative costs, since lawsuits alleging failure to
install crash bars will be summarily disposed of.
Under my theory, however, the categorical patent danger rule
could create perverse incentives in marginal cases. It may be optimal for the manufacturer to take precautions to reduce the risk
where the product user's awareness of and ability to take precautions against the risk is less than is usually the case. But in such a
situation there will be little incentive for the manufacturer to take
such precautions, since the patent danger rule provides a safe harbor against liability. Indeed, manufacturer precautions might ob119 Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
120 These facts are drawn from recent cases in Illinois, Maryland, and Colorado. In
Miller v. Dvornik, 149 Il1. App. 3d 883, 501 N.E.2d 160 (1986), an Illinois appellate
court held that the inherent risks of motorcycle riding are obvious, and that a motorcycle
designed without crash bars was therefore not defective as a matter of law. See Bossert v.
Tate, 183 Ill. App. 3d 868, 539 N.E.2d 729 (1988) (applying the rule in Miller v. Dvornik);
Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor Co., 80 Md. App. 695, 566 A.2d 135 (1989); Kutzler v. AMF
Harley Davidson, 194 Ill. App. 3d 273, 550 N.E.2d 1236 (1990) (extending Miller to
motorcycle designed with an extra-wide gas tank). In Camacho v. Honda Motor Co.,
741 P.2d 1240, 1245-48 (Colo. 1987), the Colorado Supreme Court held that it was for
the jury to decide, by application of the risk-utility test, whether a motorcycle without
crash bars was defectively designed. See Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990)
(Indiana Supreme Court applied the patent danger rule to a common-law negligence
claim but not to a strict liability claim involving the lack of crash bars on a motorcycle).
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scure a previously patent risk, and subject the manufacturer to
potential liability instead of certain immunity, further increasing the
artificial incentive to come within the patent danger rule.
These are the sorts of concerns that should make efficiencyminded judges worry about the patent danger rule. A survey of important decisions abandoning the patent danger rule confirms this
supposition. Virtually every major decision abandoning the rule relied explicitly on a passage from Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson,12 1 where
the Washington Court of Appeals jettisoned the rule. This passage
stresses the rule's adverse effect on marginal incentives: "The manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think,
ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form." 122 A more recent decision by the Florida Supreme
Court is even more explicit about the perceived perverse incentives
under the patent danger rule:
The patent danger doctrine encourages manufacturers to be outrageous in their design, to eliminate safety devices, and to make
hazards obvious. For example, if the cage which is placed on an
electric fan as a safety device were left off and someone put his
hand in the fan, under this doctrine there would be no duty on the
manufacturer as a matter of law. So long as the hazards are obvious, a product could be manufactured without any consideration
123
of safeguards.
Courts seem to have learned that the patent characteristic of
product risk often does not indicate or signal what it is supposed to.
The California Supreme Court eliminated the patent danger doctrine in a case where a bystander was run over by a backing bulldozer that had been designed without side rear view mirrors, so that
an operator of the bulldozer could not see directly behind the bulldozer. The court said that "it is not necessarily apparent to bystanders that the machine operator is incapable of observing them though
124
they are 30 to 40 feet behind the vehicle and in its direct path."
The Arizona court abandoned the rule in a case involving the risk of
head injury from a defectively designed football helmet, a case
which in fact involved rather complex issues involving the failure of
the helmet to properly absorb and transmit the force of a blow to
the head, and in which, even though the risk of a head injury was
"obvious," the defect itself may have been completely unap3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 719.
123
Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1170-71 (Fla. 1979).
124 Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 773, 467 P.2d 229, 234, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629, 634 (1970) (emphasis in original).
121
122
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preciated by the user. 12 5 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court
said that the patent danger rule may have "fit" the case in which it
originated in that state, a case involving the risk of chemical burns
from ready-mix concrete, 1 26 but found that "a rule applicable to a
...

product like ready-mix concrete cannot be applied automatically

to a complex mechanical device like a hay baler. Concrete is not
12 7
designed in the same sense as is a hay baler."'
Courts have overturned the patent danger doctrine even when
the facts of the case at hand actually seemed to fit the rule's assumptions. In Micallef v. Miehle Co.,128 the New York Court of Appeals
overruled its decision in Campo to adopt the patent danger rule.
However, in Micallef, the plaintiff attempted to remove a foreign object from a running printing press by placing a piece of plastic near
the spinning cylinder of the press. He claimed that the press was
defectively designed because it failed to contain a safety guard, but
it was also clear that the plaintiff knew of the risk that his hand
would be caught in the cylinder. 129 Thus, Micallef seems to be a case
where the patent danger rule might have been on the mark. After
sampling products liability cases, however, the court determined
that the rule no longer fit because advances in technology had led to
development of complex machines that " 'in a very real practical
sense defy detection of defect.' 130 Campo's "unwavering view produces harsh results in view of the difficulties in our mechanized way
of life to fully perceive the scope of danger, which may ultimately be
found by a court to be apparent in manufactured goods as a matter
of law." '3 '
The Micallef court implied that even defects that a court might
declare obvious as a matter of law might not be appreciated by the
typical user. As products have become more complex and riskier
and as the sheer number of risks to be evaluated and understood
increases, it becomes more likely that consumers and product users
will fail to properly estimate and to take proper precautions against
even open and obvious risks. If this is so, then there will be a large
number of cases in which the manufacturer should have done more
Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 267, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976).
That case is Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d
173 (1951).
125
126

127
128

129
130

Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App 508, 516, 476 P.2d 713, 718 (1970).
39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
Id. at 380, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
Id. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 32

N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973)).
131 Id. at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. Academic criticism displayed
the same abstract, unfocused perception. See Patricia Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does
Not Make A Right: Manufacturers' Liabilityfor Patently DangerousProducts,48 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1065 (1973).
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to lessen the obvious risk, and yet has no economic incentive to do
so because of the rule's safe harbor effect.
Note that the impact of the rule itself will be greatest when only
some product users fail to appreciate and protect against obvious
risk. If most or all users failed to appreciate such a risk, and accidents occurred with great frequency, then the product manufacturer
would have a strong incentive to make the product safer even
though the patent danger rule superficially said it had no duty to do
so. The incentive would exist because with a large number of accidents, many injured product users would sue and try to persuade
the court to bend the definition of "obvious," and indeed courts
might quickly become convinced that the risk was not obvious as a
matter of law precisely because so many suits were brought. The
paradox is that if the rule really fits badly, then it will not distort
incentives. It is in the marginal case, where the rule almost (or usually) fits, that the bright-line rule distorts incentives.
B.

The Static Efficiency of Rules: Landowner's Liability

At common law, the duty of a landowner or occupier to take
precautions against injuries to visitors on her premises depended
upon categorical distinctions among types of visitors.' 3 2 Toward
trespassers, those entering upon the premises without the occupier's privilege or consent, the occupier's only common-law duty is
to avoid inflicting "wilful, wanton or intentional injuries."' 3 3 Toward the licensee, one on the premises with the owner's express or
implied permission, the owner's duty extends to refraining from affirmative negligence; the owner must "exercise reasonable care to
disclose dangerous defects known to the possessor [owner] and unlikely to be discovered by the licensee."' 3 4 Toward invitees, business visitors or public invitees, the owner must use due care to
13 5
"keep the property in a reasonably safe condition."'
Categorical landowner liability was the rule in virtually every
United States jurisdiction until abolished in California in Rowland v.
Christian.'3 6 In rejecting the centuries-old categorical rule, the court
in Rowland said that:
[t]he proper test [for landowner liability] is whether in the management of his property [the landowner] has acted as a reasonable
132
These distinctions were apparently first sketched in the British case of Indermauer v. Dames, 1 L.R.-G.P. 274 (1866).

133

Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 244, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 570

(1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
Id- at 244, 352 N.E.2d at 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
Id at 244-45, 352 N.E.2d at 875, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
136 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); see PROSSER AND
ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 62, at 432-34.
1S4

135

KEETON
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man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although
the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the
light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on
1 7
the question of liability, the status is not determinative. 3
The California Supreme Court's reasons for adopting this case-by-

case approach to landowner liability had to do mostly with the perceived artificiality of the categorical rule's distinctions. The court

said that although "in general there may be a relationship" among
some of the "major (policy) factors which should determine whether
immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of land," "there
are many cases in which no such relationship may exist."' 3s More
specifically, the court stated:
although the foreseeability of harm to an invitee would ordinarily
seem greater than the foreseeability of harm to a trespasser, in a
particularcase the opposite may be true. The same may be said of
the issue of certainty of injury. The burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach may often be greater with
respect to trespassers than with respect to invitees, but it by no
meansfollows that this is true in every case. In many situations, the burden will be the same. 139
The above passage nicely illustrates the traditional judicial criticism of categorical rules: such rules may, in particular cases, be
either underinclusive (e.g., by granting landowner immunity even
though trespassing was frequent and foreseeable) or overinclusive
(e.g., by mandating a landowner duty of care for an invitee better
positioned to take precautions against risk). But the criticism that
categorical rules are both underinclusive and overinclusive is obvious. What the Rowland court failed to recognize, but which my
model suggests, are the substantial efficiencies inherent in the common law's treatment of invitees and trespassers. My model suggests
that a categorical rule will generate proper incentives when circumstances are either typical or extreme. In typical circumstances, the
rule is correct. In extreme circumstances, actors will essentially ignore the rule and do what is socially optimal. Moreover, because it
is easy for a judge to accurately determine whether circumstances
were extreme, exceptions to the categorical rule for extreme circumstances may be self-enforcing. At the very least such an exception
does not significantly worsen the incentives.
The common law's bright-line rule distinguishing between trespassers and invitees perfectly illustrates these efficiencies, so that
137

138

139

Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
Id. at 117-18, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (emphasis added).

1991]

LEGAL FORM

381

what the Rowland court viewed as factors arguing against the coinmon law in fact argue for it. If, as the court assumed, trespassers are
usually unforeseeable and invitees are usually foreseeable, 140 then it
is usually ex ante optimal for the landowner to take little care against
a trespasser and full care to protect the invitee.
In some circumstances, such as when risk to a trespasser will be
very likely and risk to an invitee will not, the rule's distinctions will
not make sense. But the common-law approach makes several explicit exceptions to the no duty to trespasser rule in those cases.
These exceptions are not only theoretically correct but also probably self-enforcing. One such exception imposes a full duty to use
reasonable care toward an adult trespasser once she is discovered
on the land. 14 1 Another such exception treats a child as an invitee
under the attractive nuisance doctrine when the trespasser is a child
drawn to trespass on the land by something attractive upon it.142
Neither of these exceptions is easy to fabricate. Only children can
invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine. Only a known trespasser is
owed a duty of reasonable care. There may be some blurring
around the edges of these exceptions, as in determining an upper
age limit for the attractive nuisance doctrine or defining when a trespasser is known. But generally the exceptions are narrowly drawn,
cover circumstances distinctly different from the usual case, and
likely send substantially correct signals.
The Rowland court was apparently concerned not only about
the tendency of the no duty to trespasser rule to inadequately deter,
but also about the rule's tendency to make landowners behave too
cautiously towards invitees. Overdeterrence occurs when landowners take extra care because of the invitee categorization rather than
because a risk to an invitee was particularly great. This effect, like
that of underdeterrence, is likely to be insignificant. If there is a low
probability that an invitee will suffer harm or it is exceptionally and
unusually costly to take care to protect her, then landowners will
have an incentive to reduce care in spite of the invitee status. One
may argue that landowners may be too careful toward invitees because invitees are owed a full duty of care. With a full duty of care,
the landowner's liability to an invitee is determined under case-bycase balancing. It is the uncertainty inherent in balancing, rather
than the status distinction, that is most likely to cause landowners to
be too careful toward invitees. And in this lies the great irony of
See id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 58, at 397.
See generally id. § 59, at 349-411; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965)
(describing dispositive factors of the attractive nuisance doctrine).
140
141
142
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Rowland, for if balancing is likely to overdeter in the case of invitees,
it is likely to do so also with respect to trespassers and licensees.
C.

An Intermediate, and Difficult, Example: Compliance With
Regulatory Standards, With Special Reference to
Product Warnings

Government statutes or regulations often provide clear specifications for product design or for warnings against products risks.1 43
It is rare, however, that a court will give conclusive effect to compliance with such statutes or regulations.' 4 4 Instead, the fact of compliance is merely evidence tending to show that the defendant's
product (with accompanying warning) was not unreasonably dangerous. 145 Under this approach, a manufacturer can comply with all
relevant product design and product warning specifications and still
be found liable under the risk-utility test, and possibly even liable
46
for punitive damages.'
It is generally argued that compliance with safety regulations
does not presumptively (or conclusively) establish non-liability because such regulations only establish a minimum level of safety (or,
in the case of warnings, information).' 4 7 With the development of
143
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 300-460 (1990) (over 8900 pages of drug ingredient, testing
and labelling requirements); 49 C.F.R. § 571 (1989) (over 300 pages of motor vehicle
safety specifications).
144 Conclusive effect has been given in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986) (compliance with federal cigarette labelling and advertising precluded state
tort liability for failure to warn), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) ; Sanner v. Ford Motor
Co., 154 NJ. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (exact compliance with government specifications precluded tort liability); George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584,
733 P.2d 507 (1987) (compliance with federal labelling requirements satisfied state common-law duty to warn); OR. REV. STAT. § 30,927 (1990) (if a drug product is generally
recognized as safe under FDA regulations, then compliance with FDA labelling regulations precludes punitive damage liability unless there is a showing that defendant knowingly withheld information from the agency or physician).
145
Compliance may be evidence that the product design was not defective. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (FAA approval of an
aircraft's design should be considered in determination of whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of a defect to submit the issue to a jury). It may also be evidence that the product warning was reasonable. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International
Playtex, 821 F.2d 1438, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that compliance with FDA
requirements on toxic shock warning was evidence that warning was not defective), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). There is, of course, considerable confusion regarding the
doctrinal basis for liability for failure to warn. Some courts, such as Hamilton v. Hardy,
37 Colo. App. 375, 383, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106-07 (1976), state that the failure to warn of
a particular product risk may trigger manufacturer liability even if the manufacturer was
non-negligent in its general warning. Other courts, such as O'Gilvie, state that liability
attaches only if the plaintiff shows that a reasonable manufacturer would have made
additional warnings. See MARSHALL S. SHApo, THE LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILrTY 19-20 to
19-40 (1987).
146 See O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1446-47.
147
See, e.g., id. at 1442-43; Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 86, 583 P.2d 305, 308
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extensive regulations supported by scientific research, courts may
no longer be justified in viewing regulations as minimum standards.' 4 8 Courts have been slow, however, to rigorously examine
the rationale for continuing to use regulatory rules as minimum re14 9
quirements for product safety. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
the court noted that:
the National Traffic Safety Act is intended to be supplementary of
and in addition to the common law of negligence and product liability. The common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best
interests of society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly meet the emerging and developing needs of our
time. The common law standard of a duty to use reasonable care
in light of all the circumstances can at least serve the needs of our
society until the legislature imposes higher standards
or the
150
courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort.
Although the court's reasoning in this passage is superficial, it has
been read to express the logic behind the continued use of regulatory rules as minimum standards. 15 1
Larsen and other cases in this area also rely on statutory analysis
to find no express or implied preemption of state tort law by federal
regulatory standards. 15 2 The preemption analysis, however, does
little to explain the rationale behind the minimum standards view;
instead, the finding that tort law is not preempted by federal regulatory standards follows from the determination that the regulatory
standard sets only a minimum level of conduct. A survey of important decisions in this area reveals only three reasons for this
determination.
First, there is the fear, repeatedly advanced by consumer
groups in attacking products liability reform and apparent also in
(1978); Lollie v. General Motors Corp., 407 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Wilson, 282 Or. at 65, 577 P.2d at 1325; see also M. SmuPo, supra note 145, at 11-10 to 11-

14 (discussing the effect of compliance with regulations on liability).
148 See P. HUBER, supra note 8, at 46-51 (attributing this view to misplaced reliance
on an old and anachronistic line of cases decided when regulation was sparse and illinformed and probably did set only minimum standards).
149 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
150
Id at 506.
151

Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 389 Pa. Super. 328, 567 A.2d 312

(1989).
152 E.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989) (implied
preemption), cert. denied, I10 S. Ct. 1781 (1990); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702
F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (implied preemption); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F.
Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (express preemption); see also Schwartz v. Volvo North
America Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 931-45 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, CJ., concurring) (discuss-

ing the developments in preemption analysis); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at
495. But see Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987) (no
preemption).
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some judicial opinions, that industry exerts too great an influence
over regulatory standards thereby persuading regulators to set lax
standards.15 3 While this may be a legitimate concern with some regulations, it clearly cannot provide a coherent basis for dismissing all
regulatory standards as toothless minima.
The second reason is more sophisticated, and on close analysis
turns out to be closely related to my earlier, general analysis of categorical rules. 154 Regulatory standards would be paradigmatic categorical rules if compliance with such standards was determinative of
liability. In declining to treat compliance in this strong way, courts
have been-particuarly concerned that with dangerous products, the
required degree of care or detailedness of warning may vary with
the particular circumstances, whereas regulators set standards appropriate only to common or typical circumstances.
In O'Gilvie v. InternationalPlaytex,155 for example, the court allowed a jury to assess punitive damages against the manufacturer,
despite compliance with FDA labelling instructions and despite substantial evidence that the plaintiff had been effectively warned
against the risk of toxic shock syndrome. The court emphasized that
Playtex's tampon was unusually absorbent, and hence unusually
risky relative to other tampons on the market.' 5 6 In Moehle v.
Chrysler Motors Corp.,157 the plaintiff argued that evidence regarding
compliance with standards on automobile rear seat anchor mechanisms should not have been admitted, because the federal standard
was addressed to a lesser force coming from a different direction.
Similarly, in Burch v. Amsterdam Corp.,158 the court said compliance
with regulations would not establish that a warning was adequate
because there might have been dangers known to the manufacturer
that were not included in the warning. Finally, in one of the few
judicial opinions to really explore why compliance is given so little
weight, Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court stated that compliance with FAA aircraft design specifications should be conclusive
SeeJ. HENDERSON & A. TWERSKI, supra note 116, at 455-56 (analyzing the Model
153
Uniform Products Liability Act (MUPLA), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,730 (1979)).
See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
154
155 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
156 Id. at 1446. But see Lane v. Amsted Indus., 779 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(compliance with industiy standard may negate the inference in a punitive damages claim
that a party had knowledge of a design defect, even though compliance is "irrelevant" in
a strict liability design defect claim). Section 303 of the Product Liability Reform Act, S.
1400, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S8725-30 (1989), would preclude the
imposition of punitive damages in cases involving drugs, medical devices, and aircraft
subject to agency approval prior to marketing, absent misrepresentation or information
withholding during the approval process.
100 Ill. App. 3d 353, 426 N.E.2d 1099 (1981).
157
366 A.2d 1079, 1085-86 (D.C. 1976).
158
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of nonliability, unless the plaintiff could show "that the standards of
safety and utility assigned to the regulatory scheme are less inclusive
or demanding than the premises of the law of product liability or
that the regulatory agency did not address the allegedly defective
element of the design."'1 59
These decisions recognize the potential underdeterrence inherent in a bright-line rule treating compliance with regulations as determinative of common-law liability. My model suggests that this
could be a severe problem in the product design area. It would be
difficult for a judge to interpret an exceptionally detailed and clear
regulatory directive to get the desired result in a case where the regulation seemed too lax. Regulatory compliance could thus create a
very certain safe harbor from legal liability. Manufacturers who
complied with the regulation would not only be insulated from legal
liability: compliance would essentially eliminate lawsuits by injured
consumers. Such lawsuits generate information about product risks
which can greatly influence consumers' perceptions of the product
and provide an additional, market-based incentive for safe product
design. With no lawsuits, this effect would be greatly lessened.
Manufacturers would thus have neither a direct nor an indirect motive for making a product safer than required by the regulation.
The third argument against giving regulatory compliance
conclusive force recognizes that even an optimal ex ante regulation
will sometimes be inappropriate in a particular case. The ideal regulator sets a standard that is best for the average product user facing
typical risks in using the product. The standard will necessarily
sometimes be underinclusive in that the design it mandates will
sometimes be too risky, such underinclusion can mean underdeterrence.
This argument relies on an assumption underlying all of my
analysis in Part III, which is that the actor can adjust her conduct on
a case-by-case basis and take precautions which are optimal under
the particular circumstances. But the typical products liability design or warning case involves a product that is mass marketed. The
product may be used by many different types of consumers in many
different circumstances where consumers may be sophisticated or
naive. The manufacturer, however, is generally not in a position to
modify the product design or warning to take account of variations
in the circumstances of product use. 160 For this reason, it may be
159 Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 84, 577 P.2d 1323, 1335 (1978)
(Linde, J., concurring).
160 The only way the manufacturer could do so is to make a particular feature optional for the user. Some cases have held that the buyer's failure to purchase a safety
option may be relevant to the buyer's contributory fault. See, e.g., Robinson v. Interna-
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appropriate to judge the adequacy of product design and product
61
warnings relative to typical or average circumstances.
This is exactly the kind of cross-sectional determination that
regulators are in the best position to make. Such a perspective indeed defines an optimal uniform regulatory standard. 162 Thus
when courts observe that regulatory warning or design specifications sometimes miss the mark, they are simply observing that ex ante
optimal product designs or product warnings are sometimes not optimal under the circumstances of a particular case. But precisely
because such a case is atypical, the design or warning which the balancing test indicates was appropriate in that case will not be optimal
over the entire universe of product uses (or users). Under a caseby-case balancing approach, common-law courts are likely to either
impose conflicting design and warning standards on a single product or a uniform design which decreases overall safety because it
protects against unusual risks, instead of typical and commonly oc6
curring hazards.1 3
tional Harvester Co., 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1972) (employer's failure to
purchase safety option basis for manufacturer's comparative liability contribution action
against employer). However, it is equally clear that making a safety feature optional
does not preclude a strict liability action challenging the reasonableness of the design.
See, e.g., Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Ohio law).
161
A product is defective under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965) only if it is unreasonably designed given its reasonably foreseeable use. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Magic Chef, 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980). While courts occasionally rule that
a particular use is unforeseeable as a matter of law, see, e.g., General Motors v. Hopkins,
548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), most courts send the misuse/foreseeable use issue to the
jury.
162 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation,
15 RAND J. EcoN. 271 (1984); W. Kip Viscusi & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Optimal Standards
with Incomplete Enforcement, 27 PUB. POL'y 437 (1979).
163
In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
959 (1981), the court noted that under New Jersey law, it was for the jury to determine
whether a product was "reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably
foreseeable purposes." Id. at 962. Judge Adams, however, was concerned that such a
case-by-case inquiry would not lead to optimal ex ante incentives:
The result of such arrangement [case-by-case jury decisions on whether a
product design is defective] is that while the jury found Chrysler liable for
not producing a rigid enough vehicular frame, a factfinder in another
case might well hold the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is
too rigid.... It would be difficult for members of the industry to alter
their design and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such
cases, because their response might well be at variance with what some
other jury decides is a defective design. Under these circumstances, the
law imposes on the industry the responsibility of insuring vast numbers
of persons involved in automobile accidents.
Id.
Similar concerns were expressed by Justice Linde in his concurrence in Wilson, 282
Or. at 83-84, 577 P.2d at 1334:
once the common-law premise of liability is expressed as a balance of
social utility so closely the same as the judgment made in administering
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Thus while a bright-line rule immunizing manufacturers who
comply with regulatory standards might entail underdeterrence,
case-by-case balancing by thousands of different juries would
threaten significant overdeterrence. Moreover, because product design behavior necessarily cannot continuously adjust to continuous
variations in circumstances, a rule immunizing regulatory compliance is likely to underdeter by much less than my model at first suggests. This points to the probable efficiency of a bright-line rule
immunizing compliance, provided the regulatory process was not
infected by gross lack of information about product risk. Given this
efficiency, it is better to rely on the market or regulatory agencies
than on thejury. Yet courts continue to express faith in thejury. As
one such court recently said (as elaborated by my parenthetical editorial remarks) in deciding to allow common-law automobile passive
restraint claims:
Tort actions can lead to greater insights [than those of regulators] into the inherent hazards or shortcomings of existing occupant restraint systems and test the public's acceptance of new
systems through jury verdicts [rather than through the marketplace]. Moreover, "the specter of damage actions may provide
manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep
safety legislation, it becomes very problematic to assume that one or a
sequence of law courts and juries are to repeat that underlying social
judgment de novo as each sees fit.
Warnings are similar to safety regulations. Varying jury decisions may be accommodated by simply including every conceivable risk in the warning. However, warnings
against a rare risk, for example a reaction to a particular drug, can deter individuals from
using the product under conditions in which rare adverse reactions will not occur. See
Frank E. James, Doctors Don't TellAll on Drugs'Effects, Wall St.J., May 20, 1988, at 27, col.
3. Research, while limited, tends to show that consumers are biased in forming perceptions of the overall risk associated with a multiple-risk product, and generally have difficulty making decisions among risky options that involve a potential gain or loss. See Ola
Svenson, Cognitive Strategies in a Complex Judgment Task: Analysis of Concurrent Verbal Reports
andJudgmentsof Cumulated Risk Over DifferentExposure Times, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEIHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PRoCESSES. I (1985); JOHN W. PAYNE, The Psychology of Risk Taking, in
BEHAviORAL DECISION MAKING

3 (George Wright ed. 1985). See generally James R.

Bettman, John W. Payne & Richard Staelin, Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective
Labelsfor PresentingRisk Information, 5 J., PUB. PoL'Y & MARKMNG 1 (1986). But see David
M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload- An
Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1986);James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 297-98 (1990) (while the monetary cost of additional warnings is
quite low, it is impossible to make a sensible risk-utility balance in the warning context
because there are neither scientific nor market measures of other costs of overwarning,
i.e.,
the effect on consumer information processing). For recent judicial recognition of
the potential cost of overwarning, see Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935,
938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The primary cost is, in fact, the increase in time and effort required for the user to grasp the message. The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the
punch of every other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out;
they get lost in fine print.").
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abreast of all possible injuries [not just foreseeable or typical injuries] stemming from the use of their product so as to forestall
such actions through product improvement."'16 4
D.

The Dynamics of Form: Oscillation, Not Evolution

This subpart illustrates my general theoretical prediction that
legal form will not evolve from rules to balancing (or vice versa) but
will instead fluctuate from one regime to another. Under my theory,
selective litigation implies that judges will see a sample of cases that
bring out the deficiencies in whatever formal regime is in place.
Therefore, each formal regime tends to destroy itself in the hands of
even the most instrumentally minded judges.
1. Recent Develpments in Products Liability Law
In an important recent study,' 6 5 Professors Henderson and Eisenberg document what appears to be a marked shift in judicial
opinions in products liability cases.1 66 They found statistically significant evidence that opinions in this area (1) have moved toward
benefitting defendants over plaintiffs; (2) increasingly dismiss plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law; and (3) break new ground for defendants. 16 7 I discussed earlier Henderson and Eisenberg's ratchet
theory of formal change, under which plaintiffs benefit from balancing and judges are reluctant to restore abandoned bright-line
rules.' 68 But Henderson and Eisenberg's survey of late 1980s products liability cases tends to confirm my theory of oscillating forms,
rather than their suggestion of one-way evolution.
These cases include those refusing to extend the inherently
dangerous product label to new product- categories, such as handguns,' 69 cases holding state common law preempted by federal
product design regulations, 170 cases concerning worker misuse of
products,' 7 ' and drug labelling and design cases.' 72 Most of these
164 Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union A.G., 389 Pa. Super. 328, 360, 567 A.2d 312,
329 (1989) (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)).
165
The study has already been widely noted in the popular press. See Don J.
DeBenedictis, Products Defendants Gaining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 35-36; Diana B. Henriques, FriendlierLegal Climatefor Insurers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1990, at 27, col. 3.
166 See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 86.
167 Id. at 503-16; see also Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment
on Calabresiand Klevorick, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 633, 635-36 (1985) (noting "process of retrenchment" in products liability law).
168
See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 515.
169
Id at 493-94.
170 Id. at 494-95.
171
Id- at 493.
172
Id. at 490-91.
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decisions can be viewed as a retreat from balancing, and a movement toward increased reliance on rules. A ruling that state common law is preempted by a federal regulation usually effects a shift
from risk/utility balancing to a precise rule. Worker misuse of a
product can preclude liability as a matter of law, rather than diminishing it under comparative fault principles. In fact, the drug labelling and design case most prominent in Henderson and Eisenberg's
survey explicitly rejects balancing and tends to strengthen the effect
173
of compliance with government labeling rules.
A number of reasons may explain these recent decisions.
Heightened legislative activity in reforming tort law has clearly begun to constrain judicial expansionist tendencies. Some courts
(most prominently, the California Supreme Court) have radically
changed in political composition. But judges have generally displayed much greater skepticism about the virtues of open-textured
balancing under the risk/utility test, and are increasingly aware of
the potential overdeterrence in such a jury-administered regime.
Thus, though still nascent, the trend in products liability decisions
seems much more consistent with my underlying theory of oscillation than with any evolutionary view of formal change.
2.

The Patent DangerRule

Cases in Florida and Minnesota illustrate how the patent danger rule contains the seeds of its own demise, and yet reappears not
long after its apparent death. The Minnesota cases aptly illustrate
how the patent danger rule generates cases that highlight its potential unfairness and inefficiency. The Florida cases show how the dis-

tinctions drawn by the rule tend to become more persuasive after
the rule is abandoned in favor of balancing.
The patent danger rule creates inefficient incentives in those
cases in which a risk is obvious to the user, yet it is inefficient for the
user to take precautions. Precautions may be inefficient for a particular user because such precautions are unusually costly to the user,
or because the degree of risk, however obvious, fails to inform the
user as to the extent of precautions which should be taken. After
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the patent danger rule in
Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 174 a number of cases

brought out just these circumstances. In one case, the risk of physical contact with an uninsulated electrical power line was found to be
173
See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1062-65, 751 P.2d 470, 478-80,
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 419-21 (1988) (refusing to extend the extreme risk/utility balancing
test of Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)
to injuries caused by defective design of a prescription drug).
174 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
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obvious, but the extent of the risk-the fact that the line in question
carried 8000 volts-was not. 175 In another case, the court said that
the danger was not obvious as a matter of law because the jury could
reasonably find that the plaintiff did not in fact know of the danger. 176 Elsewhere, the court said the common practice of safely lubricating a rock crusher while the engine was idling could negate an
inference that there was an obvious risk.177 Moreover, the two cases
arguably consistent with Halvorson concentrated on the plaintiff's actual knowledge and assumption of the risk rather than on the obviousness of the risk.178
Thus, when the Minnesota Supreme Court was asked to overrule Halvorson in Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing,Inc.,179 it found a pattern of post-Halvorson cases in which the obviousness of the risk
seemed to have little to do with the possibility and efficiency of
product user precautions. Product users apparently encountered
some seemingly obvious risks with little knowledge of the actual
magnitude of the risk, or under circumstances in which precautions
against the risk were not customarily taken. As custom in itself may
indicate that a practice is efficient, the post-Halvorson cases argued
strongly that the patent danger rule was mistaken in its assumption
that obviousness made user precautions efficient. It is easy to see
how the court in Holm could find these cases "a confusing set of
decisions from which the bar could find that the court appears to be
looking for a way to avoid the harsh result" of the patent danger
rule, 8 0 and why the Minnesota court's position on the "obviousness
question" was at best "uncertain."' 18 1 Faced with a seemingly arbitrary and ill-fitting categorical rule, increasingly interpreted to get
instrumentally "correct" results, the court rejected the Halvorson latent/patent danger rule and, explicitly following the lead of the New
York and Florida courts, replaced it with a "reasonable care" bal18 2
ancing test.

Experience in Florida, however, suggests that it is not so easy to
175 Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 33, 239 N.W.2d 190, 194
(1976). This case was decided two weeks before Halvorson,but was quoted for the proposition that "[s]ince Halvorson, the position of this court on the obviousness question has
been uncertain." Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Minn. 1982).
176 Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn. 1979).
177
Bjerk v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 552 F.2d 1314, 1317 (8th Cir. 1977). This holding was specifically approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bigham v.J.C. Penney
Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 1978).
178 See Allied Aviation Fueling Co. v. Dover Corp., 287 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1980);
Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976).
179 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
180 Id. at 211.
181 Id. at 210.
182 Id. at 213.
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escape a bright-line rule which, like the patent danger doctrine,
often creates the correct incentives and leads to the same result as
would be achieved under an ideal balancing test. In Florida, whose
supreme court rejected the patent danger doctrine only relatively
recently in Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones,183 the latent patent distinction has retained categorical force with respect to product warnings.' 84 In many cases, however, a legal finding that there is no duty
to warn against an obvious danger precludes a finding that the product was unreasonably designed. 185 Indeed, there is evidence that
the patent danger rule is increasingly being applied by lower courts
as a rule governing both design and warnings issues. In one recent
case, the trial judge ruled that the "open and obvious" risk that a
plaintiff would fall from a mechanical bull onto an improperly padded floor precluded his claim that the manufacturer should have
supplied landing gear for bull riders.18 6 The appellate court upheld
the trial judge's summary judgment order, but felt the need to distinguish Auburn on the basis that in Auburn "the missing safety shield
which led to the claimant's injury was an integral part of the
machine in question and the machine's design constituted a depar18 7
ture from reasonably safe and sound engineering practices."'
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has refused to abandon its
longstanding rule that a visitor on improved land may sue only the
landowner-and not the contractor hired to do the improvements-

366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
See Husky Indus., Inc. v. Black, 434 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Royal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d
214 (Fla. 1968). Of course, obviousness of a risk serves the same function as a warning
and therefore logically obviates a warning, but obviousness does not logically imply that
the product was designed efficiently. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 163, at 282.
185 For example, in Knox v. Delta International Machine Corp., 554 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the court found no duty to warn that ajointer machine would be
dangerous if its safety guard was removed. Id. at 7. This virtually compelled the finding
that "[t]he fact that the safety guard could be, and was in the instant case, detached from
the machine.... did not, as urged, render the machine unreasonably dangerous so as to
permit a jury finding to that effect." Id. Henderson and Twerski point out that warning
cases inherently involve a fhilure to "do" something and therefore look like negligence
cases. J. HENDERSON & A. TwEasia, supra note 116, at 366. From this, it is common for
a court to conclude, for example, that "[i]f the failure to warn is not negligent, the product is not 'defective,' and there is no strict liability." Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347
N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1984). Conversely, Henderson and Twerski note the tendency
for courts to hold that something fairly obvious is not obvious to give the plaintiff a
chance to succeed before ajury on a warning claim when the plaintiff could not succeed
on a design defect claim. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 163, at 314.
186 Babine v. Gilley's Bronco Shop, Inc., 488 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
185
184

187

Id at 178.
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for injuries caused by patent defects.' 8 8 Interestingly, over a strong
dissent arguing that this rule was "flatly inconsistent"' 189 with Auburn, a majority of the Florida Supreme Court said that the key to
this rule is the "patentness [sic] of the defect or the owner's knowledge of the defect and the failure to remedy the defect."' 9 0 Thus,
the court emphasized the significance of patency as a circumstance
determining who the plaintiff could sue, even as it eschewed use of
patency to determine whether a plaintiff can sue. 19 1 Additionally, in
slip-and-fall cases involving landowner liability for unmarked drops
from a sidewalk to a parking lot, Florida courts have held that an
ordinary sidewalk curb is a condition which is "simply so open and
obvious ... that... [it] can be held as a matter of law to not constitute a hidden dangerous condition."' 9 2 Finally, the patent danger
rule retains vitality under a different label as courts have found "obvious" risks "remote" or dearly assumed by plaintiffs.1 98
3.

Landowner Liability

The short- and long-term legal trends in the area of landowner
liability strongly confirm my theory of oscillation. Legal historians
appear to agree that the common law's categorical approach to
landowner liability (which we saw so harshly and mistakenly criticized for being too restrictive in Rowland v. Christian)194 originally
represented a substantial broadening of existing tort liability.' 9 5 As
one commentator has aptly described the state of the law in nineteenth century England, there was no general or only very limited
188 See Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1988); Edward M. Chadbourne,
Inc. v. Vaughn, 491 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1986).
189
Chadbourne, 491 So. 2d at 557 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 554 (majority opinion).
191

See id. at 557.

Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), cited in Aventura Mall Venture v. Olson, 561 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
193 See, e.g., Kohler v. Medline Indus., 453 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(applying rule from Matthews v. Williford, 318 So. 2d 480,481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
that "a remote condition or conduct which furnishes only the occasion for someoneelse's [sic] supervening negligence is not a proximate cause of the result of the subsequent negligence."); Schoen v. Gilbert, 404 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per
curiam) (applying the "step in the dark" rule, under which a six-inch drop from living
room to foyer is not unreasonably dangerous).
194
69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). For a discussion of Rowland, see supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
195 Percy Winfield & Paul Goodhart, Trespass and Negligence, 49 LAw Q.REV. 359, 377
(1933). Some of the findings in Gary Schwartz, The Characterof Early American Tort Law,
36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 675-76, 717 (1989), suggest that there is reason to doubt this
rather dated historical account. A 19th century South Carolina case found by Schwartz
apparently adopted the categorical approach as a kind of compromise between strict and
no liability, and treated the landowner liability issue as unresolved in either English or
American authority.
192

1991]

LEGAL FORM

393

liability for reasonably foreseeable damage; in order to extend the
liability of landowners and occupiers toward visitors, common-law
judges were forced to analogize to existing specific liability categories. 19 6 They found in the notion of contractual duty the basis for
liability to invitees.' 9 7 Licensees seemed to be similar to the recipients of gifts, and thus licensee liability was premised on a finding of
something akin to fraud. 198 The traditional distinction between acts
of commission and acts of omission provided a means to expand
liability to include even a trespasser, provided that the trespasser
was injured by an affirmative act (as in the spring gun cases). 199 By
this same token, liability to a trespasser for failure to maintain or
20 0
repair was necessarily much more limited.
By late in the present century, however, these analogies had
hardened into status-based categories, which in turn had, as my theory would predict, become riddled with explicit exceptions and
blurred by uncertainty at the margins. The appellate process systematically selected difficult cases which depicted unusual and often
extreme circumstances. This process culminated in Rowland's
sweeping condemnation of the categorical approach.
In the first few years following Rowland, several state courts
found its reasoning persuasive and similarly abandoned the categorical approach to landowner liability in favor of case-by-case balancing under the "foreseeable risk" and "reasonable care"
standards. 20 ' Similarly, in the early post-Rowland period, the California Supreme Court found that Rowland's general admonition
against categorical rules was inconsistent with the continued viability of a number of common-law categorical rules.2 0 2 On this basis, it
abolished common-law landowner immunity from liability for harm
caused by natural (versus artificial) conditions; 20 3 upstream landowner immunity from damages caused by diversion of floodwaters; 20 4 and immunity from liability for negligent entrustment of an
196

Norman S. Marsh, The History and ComparativeLaw of Invitees, Licensees and Trespass-

ers, 69 LAw Q. REv. 182, 185-99 (1953).
197 Id at 190.
198 Id at 195-96.
199 Id at 196-98.
200 Id See Barnes v. Ward, 19 LJ. (New Series) C.P. 195 (1850) and cases cited at
197 therein. See generally Graham Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and
Revaluation, 68 YALE LJ. 633, 694 (1959) ("[the common law] has placed the occupier in
a special doctrinal category").
201 This movement is summarized, with citations, in PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
supra note 43, § 62, at 433.
202 See cases cited infra notes 203-05.
203 Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 639 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783
(1981).
204 See Linvill v. Perello, 189 Cal. App. 3d 195, 234 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1987); Ektelon v.
City of San Diego, 200 Cal. App. 3d 804, 246 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1988).
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automobile when there is no continuing relationship constituting
20 5
legal control.
Within the past several years, however, it has become clear that
this trend to follow and extend Rowland has stopped and indeed may
be in the process of reversing. Judges have become disenchanted
with the uncertainty of jury-administered balancing as routine and
dear cases are reduced to lotteries between conflicting expert opinions. Even in California, there still exist some types of cases where
status or the latent/patent distinction is crucial: the California
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the vitality of a categorical rule under
which the liability of a predecessor landowner depends in large part
on whether the defective condition causing the eventual injury was
latent or patent. 20 6 In cases involving affirmative duties to prevent
harm by others, invitee status or a similar special relationship re20 7
mains necessary to establish the duty.
Recent changes in the law of landowner liability in the District
of Columbia go much farther in illustrating the return to a categorical approach. Shortly after Rowland, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit replaced the categorical
approach to landowner liability with balancing under the general
standard that the "landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the
circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk. ' ' 2° 8 The
test articulated in Arbaugh's would have justified District of Columbia
courts in abolishing all categorical landowner liability distinctions.
Indeed, for nine years this was exactly how those courts interpreted
the effect of ArbaughS.20 9 Then, in 1981, the District Court of Appeals distinguished Arbaugh's on technical grounds and held that the
landowner's duty of reasonable care did not extend to trespassers. 2 10 Subsequently, the District Court of Appeals agreed that the
abolition of the licensee-invitee distinction was not intended to
205

Talbott v. Csakany, 199 Cal. App. 3d 700, 245 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1988). For a

similar decision, see Vince v. Wilson, 151 Vt. 425, 561 A.2d 103 (1989).
206 Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476, 227 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986).
207
Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d

1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
208 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,412 U.S. 939 (1973). Note thatJudge Leventhal's concurrence goes far beyond the
majority opinion in recognizing the problems inherent in the new balancing approach.
Id at 107-08.
209 See the series of cases cited in Sandoe v. Lefta Assocs., 559 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.
1988).
210 Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 431 A.2d 597, 599-600 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
The technical grounds were that Arbaugh's had not presented the issue of the duty of

care owed a trespasser, and was no longer authoritative on the common law of the District of Columbia, due to jurisdictional changes in the intervening years. Id
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lower the status of invitees. The court held that a jury should have
been specifically instructed that, as toward a visitor who would have
been classified as an invitee, the landowner was obligated to undertake an inspection to discover latent defects in the premises. 2 11 This
last decision may not authorize a lesser duty to actors formally characterized as licensees, but certainly seems likely to facilitate statusbased directed verdicts.
Thus, the recent history of landowner liability in the District of
Columbia depicts a pattern of advance (to balancing) and retrenchment (to rules).212 On a larger scale, the abrupt halt between 1979
and 1988 in the interjurisdictional movement to abolish the categorical distinctions, 2 13 supports my theory of judicial learning. Courts
have seen the effects of case-by-case balancing tests in other areas of
tort law, and have become more skeptical of its advantages. 2 14 Indeed, the recent trend in landowner liability makes prescient Judge
Breitel's original misgivings about the Rowland approach. In Basso v.
Miller,2 15 Breitel referred to the criticism of the abolition of the categorical approach in England, and said, prophetically, that "[i]t has
been observed that abolition of all developed rules and principles in
favor of a broad 'single' standard of care is an illusory reform. Abolition, it is said, will engender only an evolution of a new set of rules
under the 'single' standard." 2 16 My theory explains precisely this
tendency for rules to re-emerge, and the law of landowner liability
confirms my theoretical prediction.
Sandoe, 559 A.2d at 742-43.
This same observation was made even before the Sandoe decision in Carl Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation ofJudge andJury
Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 15, 29-30. That article concluded that the majority of 80
cases surveyed had come out the same after repudiation as they would have under the
status categories. Id. at 53-61.
213
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 62, at 433-34.
214 For example, in Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wash. 2d 658, 666, 724 P.2d 991, 995
(1986), the Washington Supreme Court continued the traditional landowner-occupier
categorical distinctions, arguing that adoption of the Rowland balancing approach would
place a social policy decision in the hands of the jury with minimal guidance from the
court.
215 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
216 Id. at 247-48, 352 N.E.2d at 876-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 572 (Breitel, C.J., concurring). Judge Breitel cited Douglas Payne, who said:
jury trials are virtually unknown in claims of this sort, and in accordance
with the general tendency in a system of appeals from judges sitting alone
for questions of fact to be turned into questions of law, it is likely to be
only a matter of time before we have authoritative pronouncements on
the relevance of various circumstances to the degree of care required of
an occupier.... the likelihood that the courts will in course of time, by a
process of interpretation, evolve a new set of rules as to what constitutes
compliance with a broad siatutory formula ....
Douglas Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MoD. L. REv. 359, 362 (1958).
211

212
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CONCLUSION

This Article has focused solely on two issues in the economic
analysis of form: the effect of form on incentives (form and deterrence), and the feedback between ex ante incentives, expost legal decisions, and legal change (the dynamics of form). As recognized by
both Duncan Kennedy and Pierre Schlag, 21 7 however, there are at
least two other important economic issues raised by legal form: the
relationship of form to delegation in the expost adjudication process,
and the impact of form on ex ante bargaining incentives. Each of
these merits full and separate treatment. Here, however, I wish only
to suggest how the discussion above might be qualified by taking
these issues into account.
A.

Form and Delegation

One may well argue that Realism has failed to make legal decisions predictable, not because Realist-inspired balancing is inherently uncertain, but because the ascendancy of balancing has
paralleled a shift in hierarchical authority from the judge to the jury.
The force of this argument is considerably weakened by the prevalence of, and dissatisfaction with, balancing tests in areas of the law
that are primarily judge-administered.2 1 8 But in many areas of the
law, such as tort and contract, the argument clearly strikes at a real
phenomenon. It raises the general issue of how the specificity of a
legal command interacts with the level of its application. High-level
decisionmakers may prefer to send vague commands to lower officials, to take advantage of the low-level officials' superior ability to
determine policy-relevant facts in individual cases. On the other
hand, as a command becomes more vague, it vests greater discretion
in the low-level officials responsible for applying it. If the preferences of such low-level officials differ a great deal from the policymaker's preferences, then a more precise if less informed
command which depends less on low-level discretion may become
preferable.
An economic theory of delegation developed along these lines
would still miss much-for example, the comparative predictability
of written judicial decisions and unwritten jury decisions-but it
might well qualify the conclusions I have reached earlier. If, for example, judges really intend only to represent what the community
thinks is "reasonable," but have become more uncertain that they
217 Formand Substance, supra note 11, at 1687-1701; Rules and Standards,supra note 11,
at 384-90.
218 For example, the Supreme Court has become much more receptive to summary
judgment in antitrust cases, even as it has weakened per se rules. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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can interpret the views of increasingly heterogeneous and fractured
communities, then jury-administered balancing might be more attractive than portrayed in my analysis here. If, on the other hand,
increasing technological complexity has reduced the comparative
advantage of the jury as a low-level factfinder, then the case for balancing would be weakened. These issues are important, fascinating,
and largely unexplored in the law and economics literature.
B.

Form and Bargaining

A second issue of great importance is the influence of alternative legal forms on incentives in bargaining. A traditional law and
economics argument in favor of dear, categorical property rules is
that such rules will promote efficiency in distribution and production by facilitating private exchange. Recent game-theoretic analysis of bargaining, however, has revealed that when bargainers have
private information regarding the value to them of the item to be
traded, much of the potential gain from trade may be dissipated in
2 19
strategic delay, as each side attempts to get the best deal possible.
This recent theoretical work suggests that bargaining may be more
efficient when rights are not so clear.2 20 Because one of the effects
of a balancing test determination of rights is to make rights more
uncertain, balancing may therefore paradoxically increase efficiency
in private bargaining. Further analysis along these lines may enhance our current understanding, and yield further insight into the
not always so intuitive connection between form and efficiency.

219 For some models of sequential bargaining that show how gains from trade can be
dissipated, see Drew Fudenberg &Jean Tirole, Sequential Bargainingwith Incomplete Information, 50 REv. EcoN. STUD. 221 (1983); Sanford Grossman & Motty Perry, Sequential
Bargainingunder Asymmetric Information, 39 J. EcON. THEORY 120 (1986). For the general
demonstration that it is impossible to design an ex post efficient, two-person trading
mechanism that is both individually rational for the parties to participate in and incentive compatible, see Roger Myerson & Mark Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanismsfor Bilateral
Trading, 29 J. EcoN. THEORY 265 (1983).
220
See Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a Partnership
Efficiently, 55 ECONOMETUCA 615 (1987).
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A

This appendix shows that for sufficiently high administrative
costs of claiming an exception to categorical liability, such daims
will be self-enforcing, in the sense that an actor will only make true
assertions that exceptional circumstances existed. To show that this
is so, we make the following definitions:
effort or precaution level i, with i = 1, m,
or h, for low, medium, or high;
p(ei) = probability of harm, given effort level ei,
with higher effort generating successively
lower probabilities of harm;
$1 = amount of harm;
X = random circumstances determining
realized probability of harm;
Y = random circumstances determining
realized cost of effort or precautions;
c = administrative cost of claiming an
exception, c < 1.
Assume for simplicity that total expected social cost
is given by:
X p(ei) + Yei.
(1)
Also for simplicity, assume that if the actor complies,
then he incurs zero administrative cost in easily defending against suit. Let the compliance level be given by em.
Then by complying, the actor faces total expected cost
of:
Yem.
(2)
If instead the actor takes the lowest care level, but
claims an exception by arguing that circumstances (X,Y)
were such that the lowest care level was optimal, then the
actor faces total expected cost which is given by:
X p(el)c + Yel.
(3)
It is socially optimal for the actor to choose el only if
we have:
X p(el) + Yel < X p(em) +. Yem,
(4)
while it is privately optimal to choose el if:
X p(e) + Yel < Yem.
(5)
For the exception to be self-enforcing, we need (5) to
hold only when (4) holds, a condition which we are assured
of provided that:
p(e)c > p(e ) - p(em).
(6)
ej

=
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Since p(em) > 0 in general, for administrative cost c
sufficiently high, (6) must hold. Thus we have proven the
key assertion in the text: if the cost of claiming, ex post, that
ex ante circumstances justified violating the categorical rule,
then the rule/exception structure will be self-enforcing
(i.e., more technically incentive compatible).
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B

This appendix shows that total expected private cost under balancing must be less than total expected private cost under strict liability. We retain the same formal notation as in Appendix A, with
three additions:
probability of liability under balancing, given
care level e,, with 0 < L(ei) < 1, for all i;
e' = arg min [X p(ei) + Ye]; and
e' = arg min [X L(ei)p(ei) + Ye].
That is, es is the private cost minimizing choice of care under strict
liability, and en is the private cost minimizing choice of care under
balancing.
By definition of es and e n, and our assumption that L(e) < 1, we
then have directly that:
XL(en)p(e n) + Ye n
< XL(e')p(e) + Ye s < Xp(es) + Ye s,
so that minimized expected total cost must be lower under
balancing than under strict liability.
L(e)

=

